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This chapter examines the relationship between agent-based modeling and economic decision-
making experiments with human subjects. Both approaches exploit controlled “laboratory” condi-
tions as a means of isolating the sources of aggregate phenomena. Research ﬁndings from laboratory
studies of human subject behavior have inspired studies using artiﬁcial agents in “computational
laboratories” and vice versa. In certain cases, both methods have been used to examine the same
phenomenon. The focus of this chapter is on the empirical validity of agent-based modeling ap-
proaches in terms of explaining data from human subject experiments. We also point out synergies
between the two methodologies that have been exploited as well as promising new possibilities.
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The advent of fast and cheap computing power has led to the parallel development of two new technolo-
gies for doing economic research - the computational and the experimental laboratory. Agent-based
modeling using computational laboratories grew out of frustration with the highly centralized, top-
down, deductive approach that continues to characterize much of mainstream, neoclassical economic-
theorizing.1 This standard approach favors models where agents do not vary much in their type,
beliefs or endowments, and where great eﬀort is devoted to deriving closed-form, analytic solutions
and associated comparative static exercises. By contrast, agent-based computational economic (ACE)
researchers consider decentralized, dynamic environments with populations of evolving, heterogeneous,
boundedly rational agents who interact with one another, typically locally. These models do not give
rise to closed-form solutions, and so results are obtained using simulations. ACE researchers are in-
terested in the aggregate outcomes or norms of behavior that emerge and are sustained over time, as
the artiﬁcial agents make decisions and react to the consequences of those decisions.
Controlled laboratory experimentation with human subjects has a longer history than agent-based
modeling as the experimental methodology does not require the use of laboratories with networked
computers; indeed the experimental methodology predates the development of the personal computer.2
However, computerization oﬀers several advantages over the “paper—and—pencil” methodology for con-
ducting experiments. These include lower costs, as fewer experimenters are needed, greater accuracy
of data collection and greater control of the information and data revealed to subjects. Perhaps most
importantly, computerization allows for more replications of an experimental treatment than are pos-
sible with paper—and—pencil, and with more replications, experimenters can more accurately assess
whether players’ behavior changes with experience. For all of these reasons, many human subject
experiments are now computerized.
With advances in computing power, the possibility of combining the agent-based computational
methodology with the human subject experimental methodology has been explored by a number of
researchers, and this combination of methodologies serves as the subject of this survey chapter. Most
of the studies combining the two approaches have used the agent-based methodology to understand re-
sults obtained from laboratory studies with human subjects; with a few notable exceptions, researchers
have not sought to understand ﬁndings from agent-based simulations with follow-up experiments in-
volving human subjects. The reasons for this pattern are straightforward. The economic environments
explored by experimenters tend to be simpler than those explored by ACE researchers as there are
limits to the number of diﬀerent agent characteristics that one can hope to “induce” in an experi-
mental laboratory and time and budget constraints limit the number of periods or replications of a
treatment that can be considered in a human subject experiment; for instance, one has to worry about
human subjects becoming bored! As human subject experiments impose more constraints on what a
researcher can do than do agent-based modeling simulations, it seems quite natural that agent-based
models would be employed to understand laboratory ﬁndings and not the other way around.
There is, however, a second explanation for why the ACE methodology has been used to understand
experimental ﬁndings with human subjects. Once a human subject experimental design has been
computerized, it is a relatively simple matter to replace some or all of the human subjects with
“robot” agents. Indeed, one could make the case that some of the earliest ACE researchers were
researchers conducting experiments with human subjects. For instance, Roth and Murninghan (1978)
had individual human subjects play repeated prisoner’s dilemma games of various expected durations
against artiﬁcial “programmed opponents” in order to more clearly assess the eﬀect of variations in
the expected duration of the game on the human subjects’ behavior. Similarly, Coursy, Issac, Luke
1See, e.g. Batten (2000) for an overview and history of the development of the ACE methodology.
2See, Davis and Holt (1993) and Roth (1995) for histories of the experimental methodology.
1and Smith (1984) and Brown—Kruse (1991) tested contestable market theories with human subjects
in the role of sellers and robots in the role of buyers. The robots were programmed to fully reveal
their market valuations and were introduced after human subject buyers were found to be playing
strategically, in violation of the theory being tested. Gode and Sunder (1993) were the ﬁrst researchers
to “go all the way” and completely replace the human subject buyers and sellers in the experimental
laboratory double auction environment with artiﬁcial agents, whom they dubbed “zero—intelligence”
agents. Their approach, discussed in greater detail below, serves as the starting point for our survey.
Subsequently, many researchers have devised a variety of agent-based models in an eﬀort to explain,
understand and sometimes to predict behavior in human subject experiments.3
Of course, the great majority of ACE researchers, following the lead of Schelling (1978), Axelrod
(1984), or Epstein and Axtel (1996), do not feel constrained in any way by the results of human subject
experiments or other behavioral research in their ACE modeling exercises. These researchers endow
their artiﬁcial agents with certain preferences and what they perceive to be simple, adaptive learning
rules. As these artiﬁcial agents interact with one another and their environment, adaptation takes
place at the individual level, or at the population level via relative ﬁtness considerations, or both.
The details of how agents adapt are less important than the aggregate outcomes that emerge from
repeated interactions among these artiﬁcial agents.
ACE researchers contend that these emergent outcomes cannot be deduced without resorting to
simulation exercises, and that is the reason to abandon standard neoclassical approaches.4 B u ti ti s
not always clear when ACE approaches are preferred over standard, deductive economic theorizing.
As Lucas (1986, p. 218) observed,
“It would be useful, though, if we could say something in a general way about the charac-
teristics of social science prediction problems where models emphasizing adaptive aspects
of behavior are likely to be successful versus those where the non-adaptive or equilibrium
models of economic theory are more promising.”
Lucas went on to suggest that experiments with human subjects might serve to resolve such
questions, and gave several examples. Of course, economic experiments are not without problems
of their own. ACE researchers (e.g. Gode and Sunder (1993), LeBaron et al. 1999) have argued
that agent-based modeling permits greater control over the preferences and information-processing
capabilities of agents than is possible in laboratory experiments, where human subjects often vary in
their learning abilities or preferences (e.g. in their attitudes towards risk), despite careful eﬀorts to
control some of these diﬀerences by experimenters. Further, one can question the external validity of
the behavior of the human subjects, who are often inexperienced with the task under examination and
who may earn payments that do not accurately approximate “real-world” incentives.5
In addition to questioning when the ACE methodology is appropriate, one can also question
the external validity of ACE modeling assumptions and simulation ﬁndings. The current practice
in ACE modeling, following the lead of Epstein and Axtell (1996), is to point to some particular
phenomenon, for example, skewed wealth distributions, and ask “can you grow it?” by which it is
meant, can you specify a multi-agent complex adaptive system that gives rise to that phenomenon.
The emergent phenomenon in question is often the result of some casual empiricism on the part of the
ACE researcher. More precise and careful empirical support, using ﬁeld data or other observations
3See Mirowski (2002) for an engaging history of the emergence of economics as a “cyborg science,” and, in particular,
the role played by experimentalists. See also Miller (2002) for a history of experimental analyses of ﬁnancial markets.
4Batton (2000) oﬀers some advice as to when ACE models are appropriate and when old-fashioned analytic methods
are preferred.
5However, as Smith (1982, p. 930) observes, “...there can be no doubt that control and measurement can be and are
much more precise in the laboratory than in the ﬁeld experiment or in a body of Department of Commerce data.”
2could be brought to bear in support of a particular phenomenon, but this is not the standard practice.
Further, the processes by which individual agents form expectations, choose actions or otherwise adapt
to a changing environment is not based on any micro evidence. This problem has, of course, been
recognized by many others. Simon (1982) writes:
Armchair speculation about expectations, rational or other, is not a satisfactory substitute
for factual knowledge as to how human beings go about anticipating the future, what
factors they take into account, and how these factors, rather than others, come within the
range of their attention.
As I argue in this survey, ﬁndings from human subject experiments provide a ready-made source
of empirical regularities that can rather easily become the focus or goal of an agent-based modeling
exercise for the reasons noted above. Further, these data can be used to conﬁrm or refute models of
individual decision-making and belief or expectation formation.
The main behavioral principle that ACE researchers use in modeling individual artiﬁcial agent
behavior is, what Axelrod (1997) has termed, the “keep-it-simple-stupid” (KISS) principle. The
rationale behind this folksy maxim is that the phenomena that emerge from simulation exercises should
be the result of multi-agent interactions and adaptation, and not because of complex assumptions about
individual behavior and/or the presence of “too many” free parameters. Of course, there are many
diﬀerent ways to adhere to the KISS principle. Choosing simple, parsimonious adaptive learning rules
that also compare favorably with the behavior of human subjects in controlled laboratory settings
would seem to be a highly reasonable selection criterion.
In this chapter I argue that experimental economists and ACE researchers are natural allies, as
both are interested in dynamic, decentralized inductive reasoning processes and both appreciate the
importance of heterogeneity in agent types. Further, the economic environments designed for human
subject experiments provide an important testbed for agent-based modelers. The results of human
subject experiments are useful for evaluating the external validity of agent-based models at the two
diﬀerent levels mentioned above. At the aggregate level, researchers can and have asked whether
agent-based models give rise to the same aggregate ﬁndings that are obtained in human subject
experiments. For instance, do artiﬁcial adaptive agents achieve the same outcome or convention that
human subjects achieve? Is this outcome an equilibrium outcome in some fully rational, optimizing
framework or something diﬀerent? At the individual level, ACE researchers can and have considered
the external validity of the adaptive rules they assign to their artiﬁcial agents by comparing the
behavior of individual human subjects in laboratory environments with the behavior of individual
artiﬁcial agents placed in the same environments. Achieving some kind of external validity, at either
the aggregate or the individual level, should enable agent-based modelers to feel more conﬁdent in their
simulation ﬁndings. They may then choose to abandon, with even greater justiﬁcation, the constraints
associated with the experimental methodology or those of standard, deductive economic theorizing.
This chapter surveys and critiques three main areas in which agent-based models have been used
to study ﬁndings from human subject experiments. In the next section, we explore what has been
termed the “zero—intelligent” agent approach, which consists of a set of agent-based models with very
low rationality constraints. In the following section, we explore a set of agent-based models that employ
somewhat more sophisticated individual behaviors, ranging from simple stimulus-response learning to
more complicated belief-based learning approaches. Finally, in the last section, we explore agent-based
models where individual learning is even more complicated, as in a classiﬁer system, or is controlled
by population-wide selection criteria as in genetic algorithms. In all cases, we compare the ﬁndings of
human subject experiments with those of agent-based simulations.
3Figure 1: Values and costs induced in an experimental double auction design (left panel) and the path
of prices achieved by human subjects (right panel) Source: Smith (1962, Chart 1).
2 Zero—Intelligence Agents
2.1 The Double Auction Environment
The double auction is one of the most celebrated market institutions, and is widely used in all kinds
of markets including stock exchanges and business-to-business e-commerce. The convergence and ef-
ﬁciency properties of the double auction institution have been the subject of intense interest among
experimental economists, beginning with the work of Smith (1962), who built on the early work of
Chamberlin (1948). Altering Chamberlin’s design so that information on bids and asks was central-
ized as in a stock market, Smith (1962) was able to demonstrate that experimental markets operating
under double auction rules yielded prices and trading volumes consistent with competitive equilib-
rium predictions, despite limited knowledge on the part of participants of the reserve values of other
participants.
The experimental markets studied by Smith and subsequently by many others can be characterized
using the basic, one-good environment, though multi-good environments are also studied. The single
good can be bought and sold over a ﬁxed sequence of trading periods, each of ﬁnite length. The N
participants are divided up between buyers or sellers (in some environments players can be both).
Buyer i has valuation for unit j =1 ,2,... of the good, vij, where the valuations satisfy the principle
of diminishing marginal utility in that vij ≥ vik for all j<k . Similarly, seller i has a cost of selling
unit j =1 ,2,... of the good, cij,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes the principle of increasing marginal cost, cij ≤ cik
for all j<k . Sorting the individual valuations from highest to lowest gives us a step-level market
demand curve, and sorting individual costs from lowest to highest gives us a step-level market supply
curve. The intersection of these two curves, if there is one, reveals the competitive equilibrium price
and quantity. The left panel of Figure 1, taken from Smith (1962), provides an illustration. In this
ﬁgure, the valuations of the 11 buyers (for a single unit) have been sorted from highest to lowest, and
the costs to the 11 sellers (of a single unit) have been sorted from lowest to highest. The equilibrium
price is $2.00 and the equilibrium quantity is 6 units bought and sold.
In the experimental double auction markets, subjects are told whether they are a buyer or a seller
4and their own, private values or costs, depending on their type. They are not told the valuations and
costs of other agents. Buyers are further instructed that their payoﬀ from buying the jth unit is equal
to vij −pj,w h e r epj is the price paid for the jth unit. Similarly, sellers are instructed that their payoﬀ
from selling the jth unit is equal to pj − cij. The double auction market rules vary somewhat across
studies, but mainly consist of the following simple rules. During a trading period, buyers may post
any bid order for a unit and sellers may post any ask order at any time. Further, buyers may accept
any ask or sellers may accept any bid at any time. If a buyer and seller agree on a price, that unit
is exchanged and is no longer available for (re)sale for the duration of the period. In many double
auction experiments, the order book is also cleared following each transaction, so that buyers and
sellers have to repost their bids and asks. It is also standard practice to assume a closed order book,
meaning that subjects can only observe the best bid and ask price at any moment in time. To surplant
the current best bid (ask) a buyer (seller) has to submit a bid (ask) that is higher (lower) than the
best bid (ask); this is known as the standard bid/ask improvement rule. At all times, the current best
bid-ask spread is known to all market participants. The entire history of market transaction prices is
also public knowledge.
The striking result from applying these double auction rules in laboratory markets is the rapid
convergence to the competitive equilibrium price and quantity. The right panel of Figure 1, shows the
path of prices over ﬁve trading periods in session 1 of the Smith (1962) study. The ﬁrst transacted
price in period 1 is for $1.70, the second for $1.80, etc. Notice that the number of transacted prices
in period 1 is 5, which is one short of the competitive equilibrium prediction, and these prices all lie
below the competitive equilibrium price of $2.00. As subjects gain experience over trading periods 2-5,
however, the deviations of traded prices and quantities from the competitive equilibrium values steadily
decrease. This main ﬁnding has been replicated in many subsequent experiments, and continues to
hold even with small numbers of buyers and sellers (e.g. 3-5 of each).
2.2 Gode and Sunder’s Zero-Intelligence Traders
Gode and Sunder (1993) were interested in assessing the source of this rapid convergence to competitive
equilibrium in laboratory double auction markets. They hypothesized that the double auction rules
alone might be responsible for the laboratory ﬁndings and so they chose to compare the behavior of
human subject traders with that of programmed robot traders following simple rules. As these robot
players chose bids and asks randomly, over some range, Gode and Sunder chose to label them “zero-
intelligence” (or ZI) machine traders. This choice of terminology has stimulated much debate, despite
Gode and Sunder’s disclaimer that “ZI traders are not intended as descriptive models of individual
behavior.”
Gode and Sunder’s 12 ZI traders were divided up equally into buyers and sellers. In the most basic
environment, the buyer’s bids and the seller’s asks were random draws from a uniform distribution,
U[0,B], where the upper bound B, was chosen so as to exceed the highest valuation among all buyers.
In particular, Gode and Sunder chose B = 200. Buyers’ bids and sellers’ asks were made without
concern for whether the bids or asks were proﬁtable. Gode and Sunder referred to these unconstrained
traders as ZI-U traders. In the other, more restrictive environment they considered, buyer i’s bid
for unit j was a random draw from the uniform distribution, U[0,v ij] and seller i’s ask for unit j
was random draw from the uniform distribution U[cij,B]. As the traders in this environment were
constrained from making unproﬁtable trades, they were referred to as ZI-C traders.
A trading period consisted of 30 seconds for the ZI traders and 4 minutes for a parallel human
subject experiment. Within the 30 second period, the standard double auction rules applied: the best
available bid is the one that is currently the highest of all bids submitted since the last transaction,
while the best available ask is the one that is currently the lowest of all asks submitted since the last
5Figure 2: Competitive equilibrium prediction (left) and path of transaction prices (right) Source Gode
and Sunder (1993, ﬁgure 1).
transaction. A transaction occurs if either a new bid is made that equals or exceeds the current-best
ask, in which case the transaction occurs at the current-best ask price, or a new ask is made that equals
or exceeds the current-best bid, in which case the transaction occurs at the current-best bid price.
Once a transaction occurs, all unaccepted bids/asks are cleared from the order book and, provided
that the period has not ended, the process of bid/ask submission begins anew. Traders were further
restricted to buying/selling their jth unit before buying or selling their j +1 th unit. This sequencing
restriction is not a double auction trading restriction, and it appears to be quite important to Gode
and Sunder’s results.6 Of course, if every agent has a single inframarginal unit to buy or sell (those
units to the left of the intersection of demand and supply) and one or more extramarginal units (units
to the right of the intersection point), as is often the case in double auction experiments, then there
is no sequencing issue.
The results from a simulation run of the ZI-U and ZI-C artiﬁcial trading environment and from a
human subject experiment with 13 subjects (1 extra buyer) are shown in the three panels of Figure 2.
The left panels show the induced demand and supply step-functions and the competitive equilibrium
prediction (price =80, quantity=24) while the right panels show the path of transaction prices across
the 6 trading periods. Gode and Sunder’s striking ﬁnding is that the transaction price path with the
budget constrained ZI-C traders bears some resemblance to the path of prices in the human subject
experiment. In particular, prices remain close to the competitive equilibrium price, and within a
trading period, the price volatility declines so that prices become even closer to the competitive
equilibrium prediction. This ﬁnding stands in contrast to the ZI-U environment, where transaction
prices are extremely volatile and there is no evidence of convergence to the competitive equilibrium. As
the ZI-C or ZI-U agents have no memory regarding past prices, the diﬀerence in the simulation ﬁndings
6See, e.g., the discussion of Brewer et al. (2002) below.
6are entirely due to the diﬀerence in trading rules, namely the constraint imposed on ZI-C traders ruling
out unproﬁtable trades. The dampened volatility in prices over the course of a trading period arises
from the fact that units with the highest valuations or lowest costs tend to be traded earlier in the
period, as the range over which ZI-C agents may submit bids or asks for these units is larger than for
other units. After these units are traded, the bid and ask ranges of the ZI-C agents become increasingly
narrow, and consequently, the volatility of transaction prices becomes more damped.
Gode and Sunder also examine the “allocative eﬃciency” of their simulated and human subject
markets, which is deﬁned as the sum of total proﬁt earned over all trading periods divided by the
maximum possible proﬁt, which is simply the sum of consumer and producer surplus (e.g., the shaded
area in the left panel of Figure 1). They ﬁnd that with the ZI-U traders, market eﬃciency averages
78.3 percent, while with ZI-C traders it averages 98.7 percent; the latter ﬁgure is slightly higher than
the average eﬃciency achieved by human subjects, 97.6 percent! Gode and Sunder summarized their
ﬁndings as follows:
Our point is that imposing market discipline on random unintelligent behavior is suﬃcient
to raise the eﬃciency from the baseline level [that attained using ZI-U agents] to almost
100 percent in a double auction. The eﬀect of human motivations and cognitive abilities
has a second-order magnitude at best.”
One explanation for the high eﬃciency with the ZI-C agents is provided in Gode and Sunder
(1997b). They consider the consequences for allocative eﬃciency of adding or subtracting various
market rules and arrive at some very intuitive conclusions. First, they claim that voluntary exchange by
agents who are sophisticated enough to avoid losses is necessary to eliminate one source of ineﬃciency,
namely unproﬁtable trades. By voluntary exchange, they mean that agents are free to accept or reject
oﬀers. The second part of this observation, that agents are sophisticated enough to avoid losses, is the
hallmark of the ZI-C agent model, but its empirical validity is not really addressed. We know from
experimental auction markets, for example, where private values or costs are induced and subjects have
perfect information about these values or costs, that subjects sometimes bid in excess of their private
valuations (Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987)). Gode and Sunder (1997a) are careful to note that they
“are not trying to accurately model human behavior,” (p. 604) but the subtext of their research is that
the no unproﬁtable trades assumption does not presume great sophistication; the traders are “zero-
intelligence” but constrained. Perhaps the more restrictive assumption is that agents have perfect
information about their valuations and costs and perfect recall about units they have already bought
or sold. Absent such certainty, it might be harder to reconcile the assumption of no unproﬁtable trades
with the observation that individuals and ﬁrms are sometimes forced to declare bankruptcy.
Other sources of ineﬃciency are that ZI-C traders fail to achieve any trades, and that extramarginal
traders - traders whose valuations and costs lie to the right of the intersection of demand and supply —
displace inframarginal traders whose valuations lie to the left of the intersection of demand and supply
and who have the potential to realize gains from trade. Gode and Sunder (1997ab) deﬁne an expected
eﬃciency metric based on a simpliﬁed model of induced demand and supply and show that ineﬃciencies
arising from failure to trade can be reduced by having multiple rounds of trading. Ineﬃciencies arising
from the displacement of inframarginal traders by extramarginal traders can depend on the “shape”
of the extramarginal demand and supply, e.g., whether it is steep or not) and on the market rules,
e.g., whether bids and asks are ranked and a single market clearing price is determined (as in a call
market) or whether decentralized trading is allowed (as in the standard, double auction).
Gode and Sunder (2004) further consider the consequences of nonbinding price ceilings on trans-
action prices and allocative eﬃciency in double auctions with ZI-C traders (the analysis of price ﬂoors
follows a symmetric logic). A nonbinding price ceiling is an upper bound on admissible bid and ask
7prices that lies above the competitive equilibrium price. If a submitted bid or ask exceeds the price
ceiling it is either rejected or reset at the ceiling bound. Since the bound lies above the competitive
equilibrium price, theoretically it should not matter. However, in experimental double-auction markets
conducted by Isaac and Plott (1981) and Smith and Williams (1981), non-binding price ceilings work
to depress transaction prices below the competitive equilibrium level relative to the case where such
ceilings are absent. Gode and Sunder (2004) report a similar ﬁnding when ZI-C agents are placed in
double auction environments with non-binding price ceilings similar to the environments examined in
the experimental studies. Gode and Sunder explain their ﬁnding by noting that a price ceiling reduces
the upper-bound on the bid ask range, and with ZI-C agents, this reduction immediately implies a
reduction in the mean transaction price relative to the case without the price ceiling. Further they
show that with ZI-C agents, price ceiling reduces allocative eﬃciency as well (which is consistent with
the experimental evidence) by making it more likely that extramarginal buyers are not outbid by
inframarginal buyers, and by excluding extramarginal sellers with costs above the ceiling from playing
any role.
Summing up, what Gode and Sunder (1993, 1997ab, 2004) have shown is that simple trading
rules in combination with certain market institutions can generate data on transaction prices and
allocative eﬃciency that approach or exceed those achieved by human actors operating in the same
experimental environment. This research ﬁnding serves as an important behavioral foundation for the
“KISS” principle that is widely adopted in agent-based modeling. However, agent-based modelers are
not always as careful as Gode and Sunder to provide external validity (experimental or other evidence)
for the simple rules they assigned to their artiﬁcial agents.
2.3 Reaction and Response
Not surprisingly, the Gode and Sunder (1993) paper provoked a reaction, especially by experimenters,
who viewed the results as suggesting that market institutions were pre-eminent and that human
rationality/cognition was unimportant. Of course, the various diﬀerent market institutions are all of
human construction, and are continually evolving, so the concern about the source of market eﬃciency
(institutional or human behavior) seems misplaced.7 Nonetheless, there is some experimental literature
addressing what human subjects can do that Gode and Sunder-type ZI agents cannot.
Van Boening and Wilcox (1996) consider double auction environments where buyers all have the
same market valuation for the good, and sellers do not have ﬁxed or marginal costs for various units,
but instead have large “avoidable costs” — costs they incur only if they decide to actively engage in
exchange. In such environments, seller decisions to enter the market can be fraught with peril since
they cannot anticipate the entry decisions of other sellers and consequently, supply, and a seller’s
average costs (avoidable cost divided by number of units sold) can be highly variable. Van Boening
and Wilcox report that the eﬃciency of human subject traders in the more complex DA-avoidable
costs environment is much lower than in the standard DA environment with pure marginal costs, but
the eﬃciency of ZI traders in the DA-avoidable cost market is signiﬁcantly worse than the human
subject traders operating in the same environment.
Brewer et al. (2002) consider a diﬀerent but similarly challenging variant of the double auction
environment, where demand and supply conditions do not change within a trading period as exchanges
between buyers and sellers remove units from trade, but where instead, market conditions remain
invariant over each (and all) trading periods. This is accomplished by continually refreshing the units
that all buyers (sellers) are able to buy (sell) following any trades, and Brewer et al. refer to this
7Analogously, there was great outcry in May 1997 when Gary Kasparov, widely considered to be the greatest player
in the history of chess, ﬁrst lost a chess match to a machine nicknamed “Big Blue,” even though Big Blue’s hardware
and algorithms were developed over many years by (human) researchers at IBM.
8market environment as one with continuously refreshed supply and demand (CRSD).8 Recall that
the dampened volatility of prices over a trading period in the ZI-C simulations was owing to the
greater likelihood that inframarginal units with the lowest marginal cost/highest reservation value
would trade earlier than other inframarginal units where the diﬀerence between marginal cost and
valuation was lower. In the continually refreshed design of Brewer et al. the forces working to dampen
price adjustment over the course of a trading period are removed. Hence prices generated by ZI-C
traders in the CRSD environment are quite random and exhibit no tendency toward convergence to any
competitive equilibrium notion (Brewer et al. consider several). On the other hand, the human subject
traders in the CRSD environment have no diﬃculty converging to the “velocity-based” competitive
equilibrium, and are also able to adjust to occasional perturbations to this equilibrium.
Sadrieh (1998) studies the behavior of both human subjects and ZI agents in an “alternating”
double-auction market, a discrete-time version of the continuous double-auction market that retains
the double auction trading rules. The alternating DA is more conducive to a game-theoretic analysis
but diﬀers in some respects from the standard continuous DA in that only one side of the market
(buyers or sellers) is active at once, the bids or asks submitted are sealed (made simultaneously), and
there is complete information about values, costs and expost oﬀers of all players. The determination
of the opening market side (buyers or sellers) is randomly determined, and then alternates over the
course of a trading period. Sadrieh’s game-theoretic prediction is that convergence to the competitive
equilibrium price would be from above (below) when sellers (buyers) opened the market. By contrast,
ZI simulations suggested that convergence to the market price would be from above (below) when
the surplus accruing to buyers (sellers) in the competitive equilibrium was relatively larger than that
accruing to sellers (buyers). Sadrieh’s experimental ﬁndings, however, were at odds with both of these
predictions; the most typical path for prices in the experimental session involves convergence to the
competitive equilibrium from below, regardless of which side opens the market or the relative size
of the surpluses. On the other hand, ZI simulations accurately predicted the extent of another of
Sadrieh’s ﬁndings, “the proposer’s curse.” The curse is that those submitting bids or asks tend to do
so at levels that yield them lower proﬁts relative to the competitive equilibrium price; the additional
gains go to the players accept those bids or asks. Sadrieh reports that the frequency of proposer’s curse
among inexperienced subjects was comparable to that found in ZI simulations, though experienced
subjects learned to avoid the curse.
Experimentalists are not the only ones to challenge Gode and Sunder’s ﬁndings. AI researchers
Cliﬀ and Bruten (1997ab) have examined the sensitivity of Gode and Sunder’s ﬁndings to the elasticity
of supply and demand. In particular they examine DAs with four diﬀerent types of induced demand
and supply curves as shown in Figure 3. Of these four economies, simulations using ZI-C agents
converge to the competitive equilibrium price, P0 and quantity, Q0 only in economies of type A, the
same type that Gode and Sunder consider, and not in economies of type B, C or D. The intuitive
reason for this ﬁnding (which Cliﬀ and Bruten formalize) is that the probability density function
(pdf) for transaction prices (a random variable with ZI agents) is symmetric about the competitive
equilibrium price, P0, only in the case of economy A; in the other economies, the transaction price
pdf has P0 as an upper or lower bound. Since the expected value of a random variable, such as the
transaction price, is the “center of gravity” of the pdf, it follows that price convergence with ZI-C
agents only occurs in economies of type A. Cliﬀ and Bruten’s simulations bear out this conclusion. It
remains to be seen how human subject traders would fare in economies such as B, C and D. However,
as a purely theoretical exercise, Cliﬀ and Bruten suggest that an alternative algorithm, which they
call “zero—intelligence plus” (ZIP), achieves convergence to competitive equilibrium in economies such
8A motivating example is housing or labor markets without entry or exit of participants. A worker attracted by a
ﬁrm to ﬁll a job vacancy, leaves another vacancy at his old ﬁrm, so that labor demand is eﬀectively constant.
9Figure 3: Demand (D) and Supply (S) Curves for Four Economies. Source: Cliﬀ and Bruten (1997b).
as B, C, and D more reliably than does Gode and Sunder’s ZI approach. By contrast with ZI agents,
ZIP agents aim for a particular proﬁt margin on each unit bought or sold, and this proﬁtm a r g i n
dictates the bid or ask they submit. Each agent’s proﬁt margin is adjusted in real time depending on
several factors most of which concern properties of the most recent bids, asks and transactions made.
Hence ZIP involves some memory though it is limited to the most recent data available. Comparisons
of ZIP simulations with some of Smith’s aggregate experimental ﬁndings are encouraging, though a
more detailed analysis of the ZIP mechanism’s proﬁt margin adjustment dynamic with experimental
data has yet to be performed.
As these critiques make clear, it is relatively easy to construct environments where human subjects
outperform ZI agents or environments where ZI agents fail to converge to competitive equilibrium.
However the broader point of Gode and Sunder’s pioneering work is not that human cognitive skills
are unimportant. Rather it is that, in certain market environments aggregate allocation, price and
eﬃciency outcomes can approach the predictions of models premised on high levels of individual
rationality even when individual traders are only minimally rational. Understanding precisely the
conditions under which such a mapping can be assured clearly requires parallel experiments with both
human and artiﬁcial subjects.
2.4 Other Applications of the ZI methodology
In addition to Cliﬀ and Bruten, several other researchers have begun the process of augmenting the
basic ZI methodology in an eﬀort to explain economic phenomena in various environments. The
process of carefully building up an agent-based framework from a simple foundation, namely budget-
constrained randomness, seems quite sensible, and indeed, is well under way.
Bosch-Dom´ enech and Sunder (2001) expand the Gode and Sunder (1993) double auction environ-
ment to the case of m interlinked markets populated by dedicated buyers in market 1, by dedicated
sellers in market m, and consisting exclusively of arbitrage traders operating in markets i =1 ,2,...m.
In the baseline model, arbitrageurs are prevented from holding any inventory between transactions.
10They operate in adjacent markets, simultaneously buying units in market i + 1 and selling them in
market i.A s m a r k e t m is the only one with a positive net supply of the asset, trading necessarily
begins there. Absent the possibility of inventories, a transaction in market m instantaneously ripples
through the entire economy (the other m − 1 markets) so that the good traded quickly ends up in
the hands of one of the dedicated buyers in market 1. One interpretation of this set—up is that of a
supply—chain, consisting of producers in market m, middlemen in markets m, m−1,...,1 and ultimate
consumers in market 1. Bosch-Dom´ enech and Sunder report simulations showing that regardless of
whether the number of markets, m is 2, 5 or 10, prices and volume in each market quickly converge
to the competitive equilibrium levels obtained by crossing demand in market 1 with supply in market
m, and that market eﬃciency is close to 100%. Bosch-Dom´ enech and Sunder further examine what
happens when arbitrageurs can take long or short inventory positions. As the number of short or long
positions that arbitrageurs can take is increased, and the number of markets, m, gets large, prices
remain very close to the competitive equilibrium prediction in all m markets, but trading volume in the
“middle” markets (populated only by arbitrageurs) increases well beyond the competitive equilibrium
prediction and market eﬃciency declines. This ﬁnding is an argument for keeping supply chains short
(or ﬁnding ways to “cut out the middleman”). An experimental test of this prediction remains to be
conducted.
Duﬀya n d¨ Unver (2005) use the ZI methodology to understand asset price bubbles and crashes in
laboratory market experiments of the type ﬁrst examined by Smith, et al. (1988). In these laboratory
markets there is a single “asset” that is traded in a ﬁnite number, T, of trading periods; unlike
the previously described double auction experiments, players here can be either buyers or sellers,
and so they are referred to as traders. Those holding units of the asset at the end of each trading
period are entitled to a random dividend payment per unit, with expected value d. The fundamental
expected market value of a unit of the asset at the start of trading period t ≤ T is given by Dt =
d(T − t +1 )+DT+1,w h e r eDT+1 is the ﬁnal buy-out value per unit of the asset held at the close
of period T. All participants’ initial endowments of the asset and money have the same expected
value, though the allocation of assets and money diﬀers across agents. Consequently, risk neutral
traders should be indiﬀerent between engaging in any trades or trading at the fundamental market
value which is declining over time. With groups of inexperienced human subjects, the path of the
mean transaction price tends to start below the fundamental value in the ﬁrst trading periods, quickly
soaring above this fundamental value in the middle trading periods before ﬁn a l l yc r a s h i n gb a c kt oo r
below fundamental value near to the ﬁnal trading period T.
Duﬀya n d¨ Unver show that such asset price bubbles and crashes can arise with ZI agents, who are
a little more sophisticated than Gode and Sunder’s ZI-C agents — Duﬀya n d¨ Unver call them “near—
zero intelligence agents” In particular, Duﬀya n d¨ Unver’s agents are not constrained from submitting
bids or asks in excess of the fundamental market value of the asset as such a constraint would rule
out the possibility of bubbles. As in Gode and Sunder (1993) there is an exogenously imposed range
for bids and asks given by the interval [0,κDT
t ], where κ > 0. In addition, bids and asks are not
entirely random. The ask of trader i in period t is given by ai
t =( 1− α)ui
t + αpt−1,w h e r eui
t is a
random draw from [0,κDT
t ]a n dpt−1 is the mean transaction price from the previous trading period;
the weight given to the latter, α, if positive, introduces a simple herding eﬀect, and further implies
that ask prices must rise over the ﬁrst few periods. A similar herding rule is used to determine bids.
The random component to bids and asks serves to insure that some transactions take place. As in
Gode and Sunder (1993), budget constraints are enforced; traders cannot sell units they do not own,
nor can buyers submit bids in excess of their available cash balances. Finally, to account for the ﬁnite
horizon, which was known to the human subjects, Duﬀya n d¨ Unver endow their artiﬁcial agents with
some weak foresight;s p e c i ﬁcally, the probability that a trader submits a bid (as opposed to an ask)
is initially .5, and decreases over time, so, over time, there are more asks than bids being submitted
11reﬂecting the declining fundamental value of the asset. Standard double auction trading rules are in
eﬀect. Duﬀya n d¨ Unver use a simulated method of moments procedure to calibrate the parameter
choices of their model, e.g. κ, α, so as to minimize the mean squared deviations between the price and
volume path of their simulated economies and the human subject markets of Smith et al. (1988). They
a r ea b l et oﬁnd calibrations that yield asset price bubbles and crashes comparable to those observed
in the laboratory experiments and are able to match other, more subtle features of the data as well.
2.5 ZI Agents in General Equilibrium
The original Gode and Sunder (1993) study follows the Smith (1962) partial equilibrium laboratory de-
sign, where market demand and supply are exogenously given. In more recent work, zero-intelligence
traders have been placed in general equilibrium settings, with the aim of exploring whether they
might achieve competitive equilibrium in such environments. Gode, Spear and Sunder (2000) placed
zero-intelligence traders, who could both buy and sell, in a two—good, pure exchange economy (an
Edgeworth box). Traders are divide up into two types i =1 , 2 ,t h a td i ﬀer only in terms of the param-
eters of their Cobb-Douglas utility function deﬁned over the two goods and their initial endowments
of these two goods. The trading rules for ZI agents in the general equilibrium environment are sim-
ilar to rules found in the partial equilibrium environment. In particular, in the general equilibrium
environment, ZI agents’s bids and asks are limited to utility improving allocations. Speciﬁcally, each
agent of type i begins by calculating the slope of its indiﬀerence map at its current endowment point.
The slope is calculated in terms of radians, r,w h e r e0≤ r ≤ π
2; this gives the number of units of
good y the trader is willing to give up per unit of good x. Next, the agent picks two random numbers,
b ∈ [0,r ]a n da ∈ [r,π/2], with the ﬁrst representing its bid price for units of good y in terms of good
x, and the second representing its ask price for units of good y in terms of good x. Finally, the unit
of a transaction for simulation purposes involves a discrete step size in the quantity of both goods;
otherwise, with an inﬁnitesimal quantity exchanged each period, convergence could take a long time.
A consequence of this discrete step size assumption is that an adjustment has to be made to the bid
and ask ranges to account for the curvature of the indiﬀerence map. Given these trading restrictions,
and the double auction rules, market transactions will be limited to lie in the set of Pareto improving
reallocations, i.e., the area between the two indiﬀerence maps. Once an exchange occurs, endowments
are updated, and the process described above begins anew.
Figure 4 (taken from Gode et al. (2000)) illustrates this process. The initial endowment is at
point A, and the indiﬀerence maps of the two agent types intersect at this point. The ZI trading
restrictions and discrete step size imply that the ﬁrst transaction occurs along the arc BC. If this
ﬁrst round transaction occurs at, say, point D, this point becomes the new endowment point. The
set of feasible trades in the subsequent period lie on the arc B’C’, etc. Given this characterization of
ZI trading rules it is clear — even without simulating the system — that this updating process must
eventually converge to the contract curve, representing the set of all Pareto optimal allocations, and
will then cease, as the bid-ask range shrinks to the null set.9 And, indeed, this is precisely what
Gode et al. (2000) ﬁnd. Simulations of ZI agents operating according to the rules described above
yield limiting allocations that lie on the contract curve, and so these allocations are Pareto optimal.
However, these allocations do not necessarily correspond to the competitive equilibrium allocation,
the point on the contract curve where the two price-oﬀer curves of the two agent types intersect. So,
9One consequence of studying ZI, directed random search processes is that once the environment is speciﬁed, actual
simulation of the search process may be unnecessary. Still, the value of this approach lies in building the minimal,
necessary restrictions on directed random search that achieve the desired outcome. The ZI approach aids in formulating
these restrictions, by greatly simplifying agent behavior, allowing the researcher to concentrate on the institutional
restrictions.
12Figure 4: An illustration of the path of ZI transactions in an Edgeworth Box (Source: Gode, Spear
and Sunder (2000)).
by contrast with the ﬁndings in the partial equilibrium framework, ZI-trading rules turn out to be
insuﬃcient to guarantee convergence to competitive equilibrium in the two—good general equilibrium
environment.
The nonconvergence of the ZI algorithm to competitive equilibrium is further addressed by Crock-
ett, Spear and Sunder (CSS) (2004) who provide an answer to the question of “how much additional
‘intelligence’ is required” for ZI agents to ﬁnd a competitive equilibrium in a general equilibrium set-
ting with M agents and ` commodities. In their environment, ZI agents do not submit bids or asks.
Rather a proposed allocation of the ` g o o d sa c r o s st h eM agents is repeatedly made, corresponding to
a random draw from an epsilon-cube centered at the current endowment point. Agent i compares the
utility he gets from the proposed allocation with the utility he receives from the current endowment.
If the utility from the proposed allocation is higher, agent i is willing to accept the proposal. If all M
agents accept the proposal, the proposed allocation becomes the new endowment point. The random
proposal generation process (directed search) then begins anew and continues until no further utility
improvements are achieved. At this point the economy has reached a near-Pareto optimum (an alloca-
tion that lies approximately in the Pareto set, though not necessarily a competitive equilibrium; this
outcome is analogous to the ﬁnal outcome of the Gode, Spear and Sunder (2000) algorithm. Crockett,
Spear and Sunder further assume that once agents have reached this approximately Pareto optimum
(PO), they are able to calculate the common, normalized utility gradient at the PO allocation. The
ZI agents are then able to determine whether this gradient passes through their initial endowment
point (the condition for a competitive equilibrium) or not. If it does not, then, in the PO allocation,
some agents are subsidizing other agents. Note that these assumptions endow the ZI agents with
some calculation and recall abilities that are not provided (or necessary) in Gode and Sunder’s partial
equilibrium environment.
Consider for example, the two agent, two—good case. In this case, the normalized utility gradient
corresponds to a price line through the tangency point of the two indiﬀerence curves (preferences must
13be convex), representing the relative price of good 2 in units of good 1 at the Pareto optimal allocation.
Suppose that at the end of trading period t, agent i’s approximate PO allocation is ˆ xt
i ∈ R2
+.A g e n t
i’s gain at this PO allocation can be written as:
λt
i = pt(ˆ xt
ii − ωi)
where pt is the price line at the end of period t and ωi ∈ R2
+ is agent i’s initial endowment. Agent i is
said to be subsidizing the other agent(s) if λi < 0. That is, at pt À 0, agent i cannot aﬀord to purchase
his initial endowment. Crockett et al.’s innovation is to imagine that if agent i was a ‘subsidizer’ in
trading period t, then in trading period t + 1 he agrees to trade for only those allocations, xt+1 that
increase his utility and that satisfy:
0 ≥ pt(xt+1
i − ωi) ≥ λt
i + νi
where νi is a small, positive bound. With this additional constraint in place, the PO allocation
achieved at the end of period t +1 ,ˆ xt+1, is associated with a larger gain for the subsidizing agent i,
i.e. λt+1
i > λt
ii, so he subsidizes less in period t +1t h a ni npe r i odt.W h e na l li agents’ gains satisfy
a certain tolerance condition, convergence to a competitive equilibrium is declared. Crockett et al.
show that while cycling is a possibility, it can only be a transitory phenomenon. Indeed, they provide
a rigorous proof that their algorithm converges to the competitive equilibrium with probability 1.
This subsidization constraint puts to work the Second Welfare theorem — that every Pareto op-
timum is a competitive equilibrium for some reallocation of initial endowments. Here, of course, the
initial endowment is not being reallocated. Instead, agents are learning over time to demand more
(i.e. refuse trades that violate the subsidization constraint) if they have been subsidizing other agents
in previous periods. The reallocation takes place in the amounts that agents agree to exchange with
one another.
The appeal of Crockett et al.’s “²-intelligent” learning algorithm is that it implements competitive
equilibrium using only decentralized knowledge on the part of agent i, who only needs to know his
own utility function and be able to calculate the normalized utility gradient at the PO allocation
attained at the end of the previous period (or more simply, to observe immediate past prices). Using
this information, he determines whether or not he was a subsidizer, and if so, he must abide by the
subsidization constraint in the following period. The algorithm is simple enough so that one might
expect that simulations of it would serve as a kind of lower bound on the speed with which agents
actually learn competitive equilibrium in multi-good, multi-agent general equilibrium environments,
analogous to Gode and Sunder’s (1993) claim for ZI agents operating in the double auction.
Indeed, Crocket (2004) has conducted an experiment with paid human subjects aimed precisely at
testing this hypothesis. Crocket’s experiment brings the ZI research agenda full circle; his experiment
with human subjects is designed to provide external validity for a ZI, agent-based algorithm whereas
the original Gode and Sunder (1993) ZI model was developed to better comprehend the ability of
human subjects to achieve competitive equilibrium in Smith’s double auction model. Crockett’s study
explores several diﬀerent experimental treatments, that vary in the number of subjects per economy
and in the parameters of the CES utility function deﬁned over two goods. For each subject, a preference
function was induced, and subjects were trained in their induced utility function, i.e. how to assess
whether a proposed allocation was utility improving. Further, at the end of each trading period,
Crocket calculated for subjects the end—of—period—t marginal rate of substitution, pt,a sw e l la st h e
value of the end—of—period—t allocation, ptxi, but did not tell subjects what to do with that information,
which remained on subjects’ screens for the duration of the following period, t+1. Subjects could plot
the end—of—period—t price line on their screens to determine whether or not it passed through their
beginning—of—period—t endowment point. Thus, subjects had all the information necessary to behave
14Figure 5: Median, end-of-period CSS-ZI allocations over periods 1-10 (left panel) versus median,
end-of-period human subject allocations in periods 1 and 10 (right panel) in an Edgeworth box.
in accordance with the CSS algorithm, that is, they knew what comprised a utility improving trade
and they had the information necessary to construct and abide by the subsidization constraint.
The left panel of Figure 5 presents the median end—of—period allocation of CSS—ZI agents for
a particular 2-player CES parameterization, over trading periods 1-10, depicted in an Edgeworth
box (the competitive equilibrium is labeled CE). The right panel of Figure 5 presents comparable
median end—of—period allocations from one of Crockett’s human subject sessions conducted in the
same environment. Support for the hypothesis that the CSS—ZI algorithm accurately characterizes
the behavior of paid human subjects appears to be mixed. On the one hand, nearly all of the human
subjects are able to recognize and adopt utility improving trades, so that end of period allocations
typically lie on or very close to the contract curve. And, once the contract curve is achieved, in
subsequent periods, the human subjects appear to be moving in the direction of the competitive
equilibrium allocation, as evidenced by the change in the median allocation at the end of period
10 relative to the median at the end of period 1 in the right panel of Figure 5. On the other hand,
simulations of the CSS—ZI algorithm (left panel of Figure 5) suggest that convergence to the competitive
equilibrium should have been achieved by period 6.
The reason for the slow convergence is that most, though not all subjects in Crockett’s experiments
are not abiding by the subsidization constraint; most are content to simply accept utility improving
trades, while a few behave as CSS-ZI agents. The median allocation masks these diﬀerences, though
the presence of some “CSS-ZI-type” agents moves the median allocation towards the competitive
equilibrium. Hence, there is some support for the CSS-ZI algorithm, though convergence to competitive
equilibrium by the human subjects is far slower than predicted by the algorithm.
2.6 Summary
The ZI approach is a useful benchmark, agent-based model for assessing the marginal contribution
of institutional features and of human cognition in experimental settings. Building up agent-based
15models starting from zero memory and random action choices seems quite sensible and is in accord
with Axelrod’s KISS principle. Using ZI as a baseline, the researcher can ask: what is the minimal
additional structure or restrictions on agent behavior that are necessary to achieve a certain goal such
as near convergence to a competitive equilibrium, or a better ﬁt to human subject data.
Thus far, the ZI methodology has been largely restricted to understanding the process by which
agents converge to competitive equilibrium in either the partial equilibrium double auction setting
or in simple general equilibrium pure exchange economies. ZI models have achieved some success
in characterizing the behavior of human subjects in these same environments. More complicated
economic environments, e.g. production economies or labor search models would seem to be natural
candidates for further applications of the ZI approach.
The ZI approach is perhaps best suited to competitive environments, where individuals are atom-
istic and, as a consequence, institutional features together with constraints on unproﬁtable trades will
largely dictate the behavior that emerges. In environments where agents have some strategic power, so
that beliefs about the behavior of others become important, the ZI approach is less likely to be a useful
modeling strategy. In such environments - typically game-theoretic — somewhat more sophisticated
learning algorithms may be called for. We turn our attention to such learning models in the next
section.
3 Reinforcement and Belief—Based Models of Agent Behavior
Whether agents learn or adapt depends on the importance of the problem or choice that agents face.
Assuming the problem commands agents’ attention, e.g. because payoﬀ diﬀerences are suﬃciently
salient, the manner in which agents learn is largely a function of the information they posses and
of their cognitive abilities. If agents have little information about their environment and/or they
are relatively unsophisticated, then we might expect simple, backward-looking adaptive processes to
perform well as characterizations of learning behavior over time. On the other hand, if the environment
is informationally rich and/or agents are cognitively sophisticated, we might expect more sophisticated,
even forward-looking learning behavior to be the norm.
This distinction leads to two broad sets of learning processes that have appeared in the agent-based
literature, which we refer to here as reinforcement and belief learning following Selten (1991). Both
learning processes are distinct from the fully rational, deductive reasoning processes that economists
assign to the agents who populate their models. The important diﬀerence is that both reinforcement
and belief learning approaches are decentralized, inductive, real-time, on—line learning algorithms that
are unique to each agent’s history of play. In this sense, they comprise agent-based models of learning.
Our purpose here is to discuss the use of these algorithms in the context of the experimental literature,
with the particular aim of evaluating the empirical plausibility of these learning processes.
3.1 Reinforcement learning
The hallmark of “reinforcement,” “stimulus—response” or “rote” learning is Thorndike’s (1911) ‘law
of eﬀect’: that actions or strategies that have yielded relatively higher (lower) payoﬀs in the past are
more (less) likely to be played in the future. Reinforcement learning involves an inductive discovery
of these payoﬀs; actions that are not chosen initially, are, in the absence of suﬃcient experimentation,
less likely to be played over time, and may in fact, never be played (recognized). Finally, reinforcement
learning does not require any information about the play of other participants or even the recognition
that the reinforcement learner may be participating in a market or playing a game with others in which
strategic considerations might be important. Thus, reinforcement learning involves a very minimal
level of rationality that is only somewhat greater than that possessed by ZI agents.
16Reinforcement learning has a long history associated with behaviorist psychologists (such as B.F.
Skinner), whose views dominated psychology from 1920 through the 1960s, until cognitive approaches
gained ascendancy. Models of reinforcement learning ﬁrst appeared in the mathematical psychology
literature, e.g. Bush and Mosteller (1955) and Suppes and Atkinson (1960). Reinforcement learning
was not imported into economics however, until very recently, perhaps owing to economists’ long-held
scepticism toward psychological methods or of limited—rationality heuristics.10
Brian Arthur (1991, 1993) was among the ﬁrst economists to suggest modeling agent behavior
using reinforcement—type learning algorithms and to calibrate the parameters of such learning models
using data from human subject experiments. In his 1991 paper, Arthur asks whether it is possible
to design a learning algorithm that mimics human behavior in a simple N-armed bandit problem.
Toward this aim, Arthur used data from an individual—choice, psychology experiment — a 2—armed
bandit problem — conducted by Laval Robillard four decades earlier in 1952—3 and reported in Bush
and Mosteller (1955) to calibrate his model.11
In Arthur’s model, an agent assigns initial ”strength” si
0 to each of the i =1 ,2,...N possible
actions. The probability of choosing action i in period t is then pi
t = si
t/Ct,w h e r eCt =
P
i si
t.G i v e n
that action i is chosen in period t, it’s strength is then updated: si0
t = si
t+φi
t,w h e r eφi
t ≥ 0 is the payoﬀ
that action i earned in period t. Finally, all of the strengths, including the updated si0
t are renormalized
so as to achieve a prespeciﬁed constant value for the sum of strengths in period t: Ct = Ctν,w h e r e
C and ν represent the two learning parameters. When ν = 0 (as in Arthur’s calibration) the speed of
learning is constant and equal to 1/C.
Arthur ‘calibrated’ his learning model to the experimental data by minimizing the sum of squared
errors between simulations of the learning model (for diﬀerent (C,ν) combinations) and the human
subject data over all experimental treatments, which amounted to variations in the payoﬀst ot h et w o
arms of the bandit. He showed that regardless of the treatment, the calibrated model tracked the
experimental data rather well. In subsequent work, (e.g. the Santa Fe Artiﬁcial Stock Market (Arthur
et al. (1997) discussed in LeBaron’s chapter), Arthur and associates appear to have given up on the
idea of calibrating individual learning rules to experimental data in favor of model calibrations that
yield aggregate data that are similar to relevant ﬁeld data. Of course, for experimental economists, the
relevant data remain those generated in the laboratory, and so much of the subsequent development
of reinforcement and other types of inductive, individual learning routines in economic settings has
been with the aim of exploring experimental data.
Roth and Erev (1995) and Erev and Roth (1998) go beyond Arthur’s study of the individual-choice,
N-armed bandit problem and examine how well reinforcement learning algorithms track experimental
data across various diﬀerent multi-player games that have been studied by experimental economists.
The reinforcement model that Roth and Erev (1995) develop is similar to Arthur’s, but there are some
diﬀerences and important modiﬁcations that have mainly served to improve the ﬁt of the model to
experimental data. The general Roth—Erev model can be described as follows.
Suppose there are N actions/pure strategies. In round t,p l a y e ri has a propensity qij(t)t op l a y
the jth pure strategy (propensities are equivalent to strengths in Arthur’s model). Initial (round 1)
propensities (among players in the same role) are equal, qij(1) = qik(1) for all available strategies j,k,
and
P
j qij(1) = Si(1), where Si(1) is an initial strength parameter, equal to a constant that is the
same for all players, Si(1) = S(1); the higher (lower) is S(1) the slower (faster) is learning.
The probability that agent i plays strategy j in period t is made according to the linear choice
10An even earlier eﬀort, due to Cross (1983), is discussed in Brenner’s chapter.
11Regarding the paucity at the time of available experimental data, Arthur (1991, pp. 355-56 wrote: “I would prefer
to calibrate on more recent experiments but these have gone out of fashion among psychologists, and no recent more













where λ is an additional parameter that measures the sensitivity of probabilities to reinforcements.
For now, however, we follow Roth and Erev (1995) and focus on the linear choice rule.
Suppose that, in round t,p l a y e ri plays strategy k and receives payoﬀ of x.L e tR(x)=x − xmin
Then i updates his propensity to play action j according to the rule:
qij(t +1 ) = ( 1− φ)qij(t)+Ek(j,R(x)),
Ek(j,R(x)) =
(
(1 − ²)R(x)i f j = k,
(²/(N − 1))R(x)o t h e r w i s e .
This is a three—parameter learning model, where the parameters are (1) the initial strength parameter,
S(1), (2) a forgetting parameter φ that gradually reduces the role of past experience, and (3) an
experimentation parameter ² that allows for some experimentation.12 Notice that if φ = ² =0w e
have a version of Arthur’s model, where the main diﬀerence is that the sum of the propensities is
not being renormalized in every period to equal a ﬁxed constant. This diﬀerence is important, as it
implies that as the propensities grow, so too will the denominator in the linear choice rule and the
impact of payoﬀs for the choice of strategies will become attenuated. Thus, one possibility is that
certain strategies that earn relatively high payoﬀs initially get played more often, and over time, there
is lock—in to these strategies; alternatively, the “learning curve” is initially steep and then ﬂattens out,
properties that are consistent with the experimental psychology literature (Blackburn’s (1936) “Power
Law of Practice”).
The ability of reinforcement learning models to track or predict data from human subject exper-
iments has been the subject of a large and growing literature. Roth and Erev (1995) compare the
performance of various versions of their reinforcement learning model with experimental data from
three diﬀerent sequential games: a market game, a best-shot/weakest link game and the ultimatum
bargaining game; in all of these games, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium calls for one player
to capture all or nearly all of the gains, though the experimental evidence is much more varied, with
evidence of convergence to the perfect equilibrium in the case of the market and best—shot games but
not in the case of the ultimatum game. Roth and Erev’s simulations with their reinforcement learning
algorithm yield this same divergent result. Erev and Roth (1998) use simulations of two versions of
their reinforcement model (a one parameter version where φ = ² = 0) and the three parameter version)
to predict play in several repeated normal form games where the unique Nash equilibrium is in mixed
strategies. They report that the one and three-parameter models are better at predicting experimental
data as compared with the Nash equilibrium point predictions, and that the three-parameter model
even outperforms a version of ﬁctitious play (discussed in the next section).
Figure 6 provides an illustration of the performance of the three models relative to human subject
12In certain contexts, the range of strategies over which experimentation is allowed is restricted to those strategies
that are local to strategy k; in this case, the parameter ² can be regarded also as a ‘generalization’ parameter, as players
generalize from their recent experience to similar strategies.
18Figure 6: Experimental Data from Ochs (1995) and the predictions of the Roth—Erev and ﬁctitious
play learning models. (Source: Erev and Roth (1998).)
data from a simple matching pennies experiment conducted by Ochs (1995). This game is of the form
Player2
A2 B2
Player A1 x,00 ,1
1 B10 ,11 ,0
Ochs’ (1995) matching pennies game. where x is a payoﬀ parameter that takes on diﬀerent values
in three treatments (x=1, 4 or 9). The unique mixed strategy equilibrium calls for player 1 to play
A1 with probability .5, and player 2 to play A2 with probability 1/(1 + x); these Nash equilibrium
point predictions are illustrated in the ﬁgure, which shows results for the three diﬀerent versions of
the game (according to the value of x). The data shown in Figure 6 are the aggregate frequencies
with which the two players play actions A over repeated plays of the game. The ﬁrst column gives
the experimental data, columns 2-3 give the results of the 1 and 3 parameter reinforcement learning
models, while column 4 gives the result from a ﬁctitious play-like learning model. The relatively
better ﬁt of the three-parameter model is determined on the basis of the deviation of the path of
the experimental data from the path of the simulated data. Erev and Roth suggest that the success
of reinforcement learning in predicting experimental data over Nash equilibrium point predictions is
owing to the inductive, real—time nature of these algorithms as opposed to the deductive approach of
game theory, with its assumptions of full rationality and common knowledge.
Other variants of reinforcement learning model have been proposed with the aim of better ex-
plaining experimental data. Sarin and Vahid (1999, 2001), for instance, propose a simple deter-
ministic reinforcement-type model where agents have “subjective assessments”, qj(t), for each of the
j =1 ,2,...N possible strategies. As in Roth and Erev’s model, an agent’s subjective assessment of
strategy j gets updated only when strategy j is played: qj(t +1 )=( 1− φ)qj(t)+φπj(t), where πj(t)
19is the payoﬀ to strategy j at time t,a n dφ is the forgetting factor and sole parameter of their model.
The main diﬀerence between Sarin and Vahid’s model and Roth and Erev’s is that the strategy an
agent chooses at time t in Sarin and Vahid’s model is the strategy with the maximum subjective
assessment through period t − 1. Thus, in Sarin and Vahid’s model, agents are acting more like op-
timizers than in the probabilistic choice framework of Roth and Erev. Sarin and Vahid show that
their one parameter model can often perform well and sometimes better than Roth and Erev’s 1 or
3—parameter, probabilistic choice reinforcement learning models in the same games that Roth and
Erev (1998) explore.
Duﬀy and Feltovich (1999) modify Roth and Erev’s (1995) model to capture the possibility that
agents learn not only from their own experience, but also from the experience of other agents. Specif-
ically, they imagine an environment where agent i plays a strategy r and learns his payoﬀ in period
t, πi
r(t) and also observes the strategy s played by another player of the same type j in period t and
the payoﬀ that agent earned from playing strategy s, πj
s(t). Player i updates his propensity to play




s(t), where β ≥ 0i st h ew e i g h tg i v e nt oo b s e r v e dp a y o ﬀs (second—hand
experience). Duﬀy and Feltovich set β = .50 and simulate behavior in two of the games studied in
Roth and Erev (1995), the best—shot game and the ultimatum game. They then test their simulation
predictions by conducting an experiment with human subjects; their reinforcement-based model of the
eﬀect of observation of others provides a very good prediction of the role that observation of others’
actions and payoﬀs plays in the experiment.
Another modiﬁcation of reinforcement learning is to suppose that agents have certain “aspiration
levels” in payoﬀ terms that they are trying to achieve. This idea has a long history in economics
dating back to Simon’s (1955) notion of satisﬁcing. Aspiration learning has recently been resuscitated
in game theory, e.g. by Karandikar, Mookherjee, Ray and Vega-Redondo (1998) and B¨ orgers and
Sarin (2000) among others. Bendor, Mookherjee and Ray (2001) provide an overview and additional
references. The reinforcement learning models discussed above can be viewed as ones where a player’s
period aspiration level is constant and less than or equal to the minimum payoﬀ ap l a y e re a r n sf r o m
playing any action in the given strategy set, so that the aspiration level plays no role in learning
behavior. More generally, one might imagine that an agent’s aspiration level evolves along with the
agent’s probabilistic choice of strategies (or propensities), and this aspiration level lies above the
minimum possible payoﬀ. Thus, in aspiration-based reinforcement learning models, the state space is
enlarged to include a player’s aspiration level in period t, ai(t). Suppose player i chooses strategy j
in period t yielding a payoﬀ of πi
j(t). If πi
j(t) ≥ ai(t), then player i’s propensity to play strategy j in
subsequent periods is assumed to be (weakly) higher than before; precisely how this is modeled varies
somewhat in the literature, but the end result is the same: i’s probability of playing strategy jsatisﬁes
pi
j(t+1)≥ pi
j(t). On the other hand, if πi
j(t) <a i(t), then pi
j(t+1)<p i




t +( 1− λ)πi
j(t),
where λ ∈ (0,1). This adjustment rule captures the idea that aspirations vary with an agent’s history of
play. The initial aspiration level a0 as with the initial probabilities for choosing actions, are assumed to
be exogenously given. Karandikar et al. (1998) also add a small noise term to the aspiration updating
equation representing trembles. They show, for a class of 2 × 2 games that includes the prisoner’s
dilemma, that if these trembles are small, and aspiration updating is slow (λ i sc l o s et o1 )t h a ti nt h e
long-run, both players are cooperating most of the time.
There is some experimental evidence in support of aspiration learning. Bereby—Meyer and Erev
(1998) studied behavior in a binary choice game where the probabilities of achieving a ‘success’ were
exogenously ﬁxed at .7 for choice 1 and .3 for choice 2. In one treatment, subject payoﬀs were set
20at 2 for a success and -2 for a failure, while in another treatment, the payoﬀs were 4 for a success
and 0 for a failure, amounting to an addition of 2 to the payoﬀsi nt h eﬁrst case. They found that
learning of the optimal choice of strategies (choice 1) was signiﬁcantly reduced when the payoﬀsw e r e
(4,0) relative to the case where the payoﬀs were (2,-2). Bereby—Meyer, Erev and Roth (1999) explain
this result by presenting an adjustable reference point reinforcement learning model. In place of the
assumption that R(x)=x − xmin in the Roth-Erev model, they propose that R(x,t)=x(t) − ρ(t),
and let the reference point, ρ(t) be a weighted average of the past reference point and current payoﬀs,
where the weights depend on the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ and the reference point; if payoﬀsa r e
highly variable relative to the reference point, learning is slower than if payoﬀs are less variable; this
is simply another version of aspiration learning. They report that this model tracks the diﬀerence in
the experimental ﬁndings rather well.
Huck et al. (2002) ﬁnd evidence of aspiration learning in a laboratory oligopoly experiment.
They test the theoretical proposition that bilateral mergers in oligopoly markets with n>2 ﬁrms,
homogeneous goods and constant returns to scale are unproﬁtable; the proﬁt share of the merged
ﬁrm, 1/n − 1 is less than the total share of the two ﬁrms prior to the merger 2/n (1/n each). In the
experiment, n>2 subjects make quantity decisions in a Cournot game and midway through a session,
two of the subjects combine decision-making as a merged ﬁrm. The authors report that, contrary to
theory, the subjects in the role of the merged ﬁrm produce signiﬁcantly more output than the other
unmerged ﬁrms and come close to sustaining total proﬁt levels they would have achieved as unmerged
ﬁrms. The authors argue that pre-merger aspiration-levels cause merged ﬁrms to increase output with
the aim of maintaining total proﬁts and the other ﬁrms acquiesce by reducing their output. They
connect this ﬁnding with Cyert and March’s (1956) observation that oligopoly ﬁrms are guided by “an
acceptable—level proﬁt norm” that is a function of market history.
Varieties of reinforcement learning algorithms have become a mainstay of agent-based modeling,
perhaps because they accord with Axelrod’s KISS principle. Other attractive features are the low level
of history—dependent rationality, and relatively few parameters. Examples of the use of reinforcement
learning in agent-based models are commonplace. Epstein and Axtell (1996) use several variants of
reinforcement learning in their Sugarscape model. Nicolaisen, Petrov and Tesfatsion (2001) uses Roth-
Erev-type reinforcement learning to model buyer and seller price—quantity decisions in a computational
model of the wholesale electricity market. Pemantle and Skyrms (2003) use reinforcement learning
to study how groups of players play games in endogenously formed social networks. Franke (2003)
uses reinforcement learning to study Arthur’s (1994) El Farol Bar problem; Kutschinski, Uthmann
and Polani (2003) use a reinforcement learning model to study buyer search and seller price setting
behavior in a competitive market with induced demand and supply schedules. Erev and Barron (2003)
apply reinforcement learning to cognitive strategies, (e.g. loss avoidance, hill—climbing) rather than to
the direct strategies available to agents in simple, repeated decision problems. Bendor et al. (2003)
use a reinforcement learning model with endogenous aspirations to model voter turn-out.
There is also a parallel and much more voluminous literature on reinforcement learning in the
machine learning literature. See, e.g., Kaelbling et al. (1996) Sutton and Barto (1998) for surveys. A
popular reinforcement learning model in this literature is Q—learning (Watkins, 1989), which is closely
related to Bellman’s approach to dynamic programming, but diﬀers from the latter in being much
less informationally demanding, e.g. the agent need not know the period payoﬀ or state transition
functions. (See, e.g. Mitchell (1997) for a good introduction the topic). Q—learning algorithms involve
on-line estimation of an evaluation function, denoted Q(s,a), representing the maximum expected
discounted sum of future payoﬀs the agent earns from taking action a in state s. Starting from some
random initialization of values, estimation of the Q function occurs in real—time using the history
of states and payoﬀs earned by the agent from action choices in those states. To determine the
action chosen, a probabilistic choice rule is used: actions with higher Q-values for the given state
21s and the current approximation of the Q—function, are more likely to be chosen than actions with
lower Q-values. Thus, the main diﬀerence between Q—learning and the reinforcement-learning models
studied by economists is that Q—learners are learning an evaluation function mapping from states to
actions, analogous to the policy function of dynamic programming. An advantage of Q—learning over
reinforcement learning algorithms studied by economists is that, convergence results for Q—learning
can be proved under certain assumptions, e.g. for simple Markov-decision processes. Surprisingly,
the predictions of Q—learning models have yet to be compared with data from controlled laboratory
experiments with human subjects — a good topic for future research.
3.2 Belief-based learning
The primary diﬀerence between belief-based learning algorithms and reinforcement learning algorithms
is that in belief-learning models, players recognize they are playing a game or participating in a market
with other players, and form beliefs about the likely play of these other players. Their choice of strategy
is then a best response to their beliefs. By contrast, reinforcement learners do not form beliefs about
other players and need not even realize that they are playing a game or participating in a market
with others. Belief-based learning models range from naive, Cournot-type learning to slightly more
sophisticated “ﬁctitious play,” to fully rational, Bayesian learning. Here we discuss the ﬁrst two types
of belief learning models.
Fictitious play was proposed by Brown (1951) as a model of how players form beliefs and best
respond to them in two-person zero sum games. Fictitious play was originally proposed as a means
of determining the value of a game; indeed, Robinson (1951) shows that ﬁctitious play converges to
equilibrium in 2 × 2 zero sum games, though Shapley shows via a counterexample that this result
does not hold in more general games. Subsequently, ﬁctitious play has come to serve as a model
of boundedly rational learning: players form beliefs about their opponents based on the historical
frequency of their opponent’s actions choices and play myopic best responses to these beliefs; the
best responses are myopic because agents do not anticipate that their opponent is behaving similarly
toward them.
Cheung and Friedman (1997) propose a one—parameter class of learning rules that yields Cournot
and ﬁctitious play learning as special cases, and thus serves to compactly illustrate the main diﬀerence
between the two approaches. They suppose there are i =1 ,2,..N players, each of whom chooses an
action ai from the set of possible actions, A,i ne a c hp e r i o d .P l a y e ri’s payoﬀ function is π(ai,s −i),
where s−i is a state variable representing the distribution of actions played by all of i’s opponents. It
is assumed that each player i discounts past states using a constant discount factor, γi,a n dp o s s e s s e s
some initial prior, s−i(1). Player i’s belief about the state that will prevail in periods t =1 ,2,... is
given by:










Cournot (naive) belief learning results from setting γi =0f o ra l li; in this case, players hold the
naive belief that ˆ s−i(t+1)=s−i(t). Fictitious play belief learning results from setting γi =1f o ra l li;
in this case, players’ beliefs about the current state are simply the average of all past observed states.
Weighted average, adaptive belief learning results from setting 0 < γi < 1.13 Given beliefs, a player’s
decision is to choose ai so as to maximize his expected payoﬀ (i.e., maxai∈A π(ai, ˆ s−i)).
Consider by way of illustration, the class of 2 player, binary choice games that have been widely
studied in the experimental literature. Let the 2 × 2p a y o ﬀ matrix be given by M =( mij), and let
13Other, less plausible possibilities include γ > 1, so that the past is given more weight than the present and γi < 0,
which implies cycling.
22us assign a ‘1’ to the choice of action 1 and a ‘0’ to the choice of action 2. With a single opponent
per period, s−i(t) ∈ {0, 1} and ˆ s−i(t) ∈ [0,1] represents player i’s belief about the likelihood that
his opponent will play action 1 in period t.14 Player i evaluates the expected payoﬀ diﬀerential from
choosing action 1 over action 2:
ri1 = R(ˆ s−i(t)) = (1,−1)M(ˆ s−i(t),1 − ˆ s−i(t))0.
A deterministic best response in the binary choice game is to choose action 1 if R(ˆ s−i(t)) > 0a n dt o
choose action 2 if R(ˆ s−i(t)) < 0. Some kind of tie-breaking rule is needed for the special case where
R(ˆ s−i(t)) = 0. As Fudenberg and Levine (1998) note, ﬁctitious play (γ = 1) is a form of Bayesian
learning in the special case where a player’s prior beliefs over the distribution of opponent strategies
is Dirichlet.
As was the case under reinforcement learning, researchers examining the predictions of Cournot or
ﬁctitious play belief learning have added some kind of noise to the deterministic best response. Boylan
and El-Gamal (1993) propose that agents play the deterministic best response with probability 1−²,
and any of the available actions a ∈ A with probability ²/A.
Fudenberg and Levine (1998) propose a stochastic approximation to deterministic ﬁctitious play —
smooth ﬁctitious play — which can be implemented, as in Cheung and Friedman (1997), through the
use of the logistic function:
pij(t)=
1
1+e−xi(t), where xi(t)=αi + βirij(t),
where αi is an individual speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect indicating individual i’s bias for action 1 (αi =0r e v e a l s
an unbiased choice) and βi representing the sensitivity of choices to expected payoﬀ diﬀerentials.
These stochastic versions of ﬁctitious play have several advantages over deterministic ﬁctitious play.
First, they do not imply that behavior switches dramatically with small changes in the data agents
use to form beliefs. Second, insisting that strategies remain probabilistic has certain advantages, e.g.
when agents have achieved near convergence to a mixed strategy equilibrium and need to keep their
opponent guessing even though the diﬀerences in utility from the various actions may be quite small.
(See Fudenberg and Levine (1998) for a further discussion).
Boylan and El Gamal (1993) use a Bayesian approach to assess the likelihood that behavior in
9d i ﬀerent matrix game experiments (conducted by other researchers) is consistent with either the
noisy-Cournot or the noisy-ﬁctitious play hypothesis. They ﬁnd that for some games, the Cournot
belief hypothesis is favored while for other games the ﬁctitious play hypothesis is favored. Their over
all assessment of the relative validity of the two learning hypotheses is that ﬁctitious play describes
the experimental data better than Cournot learning.
Cheung and Friedman (1997) estimate their three parameter model (α, β, γ)o nd a t af r o ms e v e r a l
diﬀerent bimatrix games. Median estimates of α, β and γ are all signiﬁcantly positive; the ﬁnding that
γ > 0 rules out the Cournot belief hypothesis. Further they report they can reject the hypothesis that
γ =1 ( ﬁctitious play). Indeed, their estimates of γ always lie between 0 and 1 indicating that subjects’
belief updating process is neither Cournot or ﬁctitious play, but is instead approximated best by some
adaptive intermediate case.
In addition to asking which belief-based learning model best predicts experimental data, one can
also explore the empirical validity of the belief formation process associated with these belief-based
models. This can be simply accomplished by asking subjects to state, prior to play of the game, their




where I(j)=1i faj =1a n dI(aj)=0o t h e r w i s e .
23Figure 7: Stated versus Fictitious Play Beliefs of a Typical Subject in Nyarko and Schotter’s Experi-
ment (Source: Nyarko and Schotter (2002, ﬁg. 2)).
beliefs about their opponent’s play and comparing these stated beliefs with those predicted by belief-
based learning models. Nyarko and Schotter (2002) have carried out such an exercise in a simple
2 × 2matrix game where the unique Nash equilibrium prediction is in mixed strategies. The two
strategies were labeled Green and Red, and the equilibrium calls on both players to play Green (Red)
with probability .4 (.6). Nyarko and Schotter asked subjects to state the probability with which they
thought their opponent would play Green prior to the play of each round. Subjects’ compensation
was determined in part by the accuracy of their stated beliefs and in part by the payoﬀs they received
from playing the game.
Figure 7 plots stated beliefs against those predicted by ﬁctitious play for a “typical subject” in
Nyarko and Schotter’s experiment. As is apparent, the variance in subject beliefs is much greater than
predicted by ﬁctitious play, and the diﬀerences do not decrease with experience. The same holds true
for Cournot beliefs. Nyarko and Schotter further conclude that best responses to stated beliefs provide
a better account of the path of actions chosen by the subjects than does reinforcement or a hybrid
belief-reinforcement model discussed below. This evidence suggests both that subjects are following
some kind of belief-learning process and that a good model of that belief formation process has yet to
be developed.
Belief-based learning models also make strong predictions regarding equilibrium selection in en-
vironments with multiple, Pareto rankable equilibria. Essentially, belief-based models predict that if
the initial conditions lie in the domain of attraction of a particular equilibria under the belief learning
dynamic, then, with experience, agents will learn over time to coordinate on that equilibrium, regard-
less of its eﬃciency. This hypothesis has been experimentally tested by Van Huyck et al. (1997) and
Battalio et al. (2001) in the context of simple coordination games where the domain of attraction of
the two symmetric pure strategy equilibria is deﬁned by the best response separatrix. Van Huyck et
al. (1997) show that both Cournot and ﬁctitious play learning dynamics predict diﬀerent equilibrium
outcomes depending on initial conditions in a median eﬀort game (involving strategic complementar-
24ities), and their experimental ﬁndings are remarkably accurate on this score. If the initial condition
(median eﬀort) lies in the domain of attraction of the unique, payoﬀ-dominant equilibrium, subjects
subsequently coordinate on that equilibrium, otherwise they coordinate on the other symmetric Nash
equilibrium. As Van Huyck et al. point out, this behavior is very diﬀerent from deductive equilibrium
selection principles, which might involve, for instance, calculation of all equilibria and selection of the
payoﬀ dominant one.
The use of belief-based learning models by economists is not limited to normal form games. Vari-
eties of belief-based learning models have also been used to study bid and ask behavior in the double
auction.15 Gjerstad and Dickhaut (1998) provide a particularly elegant characterization of the DA and
propose heuristic rules by which buyers and sellers assess and update the probability that their bids
or asks will be accepted, given market history. Using these beliefs together with private information
on valuations and costs, individual buyers or sellers propose bids or asks that maximize their (myopic)
expected surplus. The main parameter in their model is the length of memory that players use in
calculating probabilities. Using a stricter convergence criterion than Gode and Sunder adopt, Gjerstad
and Dickhaut show via simulations that their heuristic belief-learning model can more reliably achieve
convergence to competitive equilibrium than Gode and Sunder’s ZI—C model, and the belief-learning
model provides a better ﬁt to the aggregate human subject data as well. Indeed, in their chapter in
this handbook, MacKie-Masson and Wellman argue that this heuristic belief-learning model represents
the best agent-based model of the DA. Still, the ﬁt of this belief-learning model to individual human
subject behavior remains to be examined.
Belief-based learning models are less common in the agent-based literature than are reinforcement
learning models, perhaps for the simple reason that belief-based models require that agents possess
more memory (e.g. the histories of their opponents). Still, some versions of belief—based learning can
be found see, e.g. Kandori et al. (1993), Young (1993, 1998); naive Cournot best response behavior is
also found see, e.g. Ellison (1993) or Morris (2000).
3.3 Comparisons of Reinforcement and Belief-Based Learning
A large literature is devoted to testing whether simple reinforcement or more complicated belief-based
learning algorithms better characterize experimental data from a wide variety of diﬀerent games. In
addition to the papers of Roth and Erev and Cheung and Friedman mentioned above, other papers
comparing versions of these two approaches to learning include Mookherjee and Sopher (1994, 1997),
Camerer and Ho (1999), Feltovich (2000), Salmon (2001), Blume et al. (2002), Stahl (1999) and
Haruvy and Stahl (2004) among others. In making these comparisons, researchers have adopted some
kind of goodness—of—ﬁt metric or made use of an econometric estimator to assess the ﬁto fv a r i o u s
candidate learning models to experimental data.
The ﬁndings from this literature are varied, but several conclusions appear to have wide support.
First, the evidence is very strong that either reinforcement or belief-based learning models are better
predictors of human subject behavior than are the static Nash equilibrium point predictions. This is
strong evidence in favor of the bottom—up, inductive reasoning approaches used by ACE researchers
as opposed to the top—down, forward—looking, deductive reasoning of fully rational players that gives
rise to those equilibrium point predictions. Second, in the simple games that experimentalists have
studied, reinforcement and belief-based learning models do not yield predictions that are all that
distinct from one another and so identifying which rule performs well across a variety of diﬀerent
games leads to murky outcomes that appear sensitive to various particulars of the datasets or games
examined (Feltovich (2000), Salmon (2001)). Given the lack of a clear bias in favor of reinforcement or
15Early eﬀorts include Friedman (1991) and Easley and Ledyard (1993).
25belief-based approaches over a wide variety of games, a natural approach is to adopt a hybrid model
that allows for both reinforcement and belief-based learning as special cases, as well as mixtures of
both. This is the approach taken by Camerer and Ho (1999). While this approach has had some
success in explaining data from human subject experiments (see Camerer (2003) for an extensive and
detailed assessment), the additional complexity entailed, e.g., more parameters to calibrate, may make
it less appealing to ACE researchers.16 Third, there is some evidence that if subjects’ information is
restricted to their own histories of play, that reinforcement learning models perform slightly better than
belief-based learning models that use data on opponent’s histories that was unavailable to subjects.
Analogously, in environments where data on opponent’s histories was made available, players appear
to condition their expectations, in part, on those histories, in line with the predictions of belief-based
models. (Blume et al. 2002). These ﬁndings are not so surprising, and, indeed, simply conﬁrm that
players use histories to form expectations. Finally, there is some evidence that the complexity of the
game, the manner in which players are matched and the length of play are all important factors in
the accuracy of learning models in predicting the play of human subjects.
On the latter point, much of the observed diﬀerences in the two approaches to modeling learning
may be tied up with the relatively small periods of time over which individual human subject exper-
iments are conducted. While experimentalists often give their subjects repeated experience with a
game or decision, concerns about subject boredom or the salience of participation payments severely
restrict the length of the time series that can be generated in the laboratory for any individual subject.
By contrast, ACE researchers do not feel bound by such considerations, and think nothing of simu-
lating their models out for very long periods of time. Asymptotically, the behavior of reinforcement
and belief-based models may not be all that diﬀerent. Hopkins (2002) shows that both reinforcement
learning and stochastic ﬁctitious play can be viewed as noisy versions of replicator dynamics (dis-
cussed later in section 4.1), and that the asymptotic predictions of these two models may be the same;
roughly speaking if an equilibrium is locally stable under stochastic ﬁctitious play, then the same holds
true under reinforcement learning. Duﬀy and Hopkins (2004) conduct experiments with a longer than
typical number of repetitions under various information conditions in an eﬀort to test this prediction
and ﬁnd that it has some, qualiﬁed support. An implication of these ﬁndings for ACE researchers is
that the kind of learning rule that agents are endowed with may not be of such great importance if
the research interest lies in the long-run behavior of the agent-based system.
3.4 Summary
Unlike ZI agent models, reinforcement and belief-based learning models presume that agents have
some memory. These models of inductive reasoning have been primarily studied in the context of
simple two player games. Reinforcement learners condition their actions on their own histories of play
and abide by the principle that actions that have yielded relatively high (low) payoﬀs in the past
are more (less) likely to be played in subsequent periods. Belief-based learning models assume that
players have history dependent beliefs over the actions their opponents are likely to play, and they
choose actions that are myopic best responses to these beliefs. While there is no guarantee that either
type of learning model converges to an equilibrium, these models have nevertheless proven useful in
tracking the behavior of human subjects in controlled laboratory settings.
Reinforcement learning models have been widely used in the agent-based literature, perhaps for the
simple reason that they require only information on an individual’s own history (payoﬀs and actions).
In complex, multi-agent settings, this parsimony of information may be an important consideration in
the modeling of agent learning. On the other hand, in settings with just a few agents, and especially
16See, however, a simpler, one-parameter version of their model given in Ho, Camerer and Chong (2002).
26in settings where agents interact with one another repeatedly, a belief-based learning approach may be
more appropriate. Indeed, the available experimental evidence suggests that agents do condition their
actions on both their own history of play and, when available, on information about the play of their
opponents. However, the manner in which they do this does not appear to be strictly consistent with
either reinforcement or belief-based learning models. Asymptotically, there may be little diﬀerence
between the two approaches.
4 Evolutionary Algorithms as Models of Agent Behavior
In addition to directed random (ZI-agent) searches and individual learning approaches, agent-based
researchers have used a variety of diﬀerent evolutionary algorithms to characterize the behavior of
populations of heterogenous, interacting, boundedly rational agents facing various economic decisions.
Examples include replicator dynamics, genetic algorithms, classiﬁer systems and genetic programming.
These evolutionary algorithms diﬀer from the learning processes considered so far in several respects.
First, evolutionary algorithms were designed to mimic naturally occurring, biological processes. Not
surprisingly, these algorithms can be diﬃcult for social scientists to interpret and for experimentalists
to test in the laboratory. Second, these methods are population—based, which is to say that the ﬁtness
of a particular individual or strategy (the distinction becomes blurred in this literature) is based on
its performance relative to a certain population of individuals (or strategies). Thus, these algorithms
presume that ﬁtness values across individuals/strategies are readily and immediately available for com-
parison purposes; in this regard, they can be viewed as the most complex class of algorithms (or least
decentralized) in the set of approaches considered in this chapter. Third, as with ZI or reinforcement
learning, evolutionary algorithms are not belief-based; players are not aware that they are playing
a game against other players and do not act strategically in any way. Fourth, some evolutionary
algorithms, e.g. genetic algorithms and genetic programming are employed in environments where
strategies or equilibrium policy functions cannot be characterized analytically. This (alternative) use
of evolutionary algorithms is owing to the performance of these algorithms as function optimizers in
complex landscapes; indeed, genetic algorithms were developed for precisely this purpose. Finally, evo-
lutionary algorithms may, or may not be well-suited to modeling economic decision-making. Evolution
is often a slow process and so algorithms that mimic this process tend to work best on an unchanging
landscape. However, economic systems are often modeled as state dependent, and may also be subject
to temporary shocks or more permanent structural shifts. In such environments, the performance of
evolutionary algorithms may be degraded relative to the less volatile (natural) landscapes for which
they were developed.
Despite these potential problems and shortcomings, evolutionary algorithms are widely used by
agent-based modelers. By contrast, with the other agent-based approaches we have discussed, evolu-
tionary algorithms have not been developed or adapted to explain data from economic decision-making
experiments. For the most part, the opposite has occurred; agent-based researchers have sought to
validate the predictions of evolutionary algorithms by conducting experiments with human subjects
placed in the same environments. In certain cases, the experimental environment has been modiﬁed
to better approximate the evolutionary environment! These comparisons have met with some suc-
cess, but as I will argue, some diﬃculties of interpretation remain, for example, the question of the
appropriate time-frame for comparisons. It may simply be that evolutionary algorithms cannot be
adequately tested using human subject experiments.
274.1 Replicator Dynamics
Replicator dynamics comprise the simplest class of evolutionary algorithms that economists have used
to model the behavior of populations of players. See Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988, 1998) for a complete
treatment. These models presume that the set of strategies (or phenotypes) does not evolve, and that
reproduction is asexual. The assumption of a small strategy space is most likely to be satisﬁed in
simple games, and so it is not surprising that replicator dynamics have mainly been employed by
game theorists.
To understand how replicator dynamics work, consider a game with N strategies, and let s(t) ≡
(si(t))i=1,2,..N be a vector representing the proportions of the N strategies in the population at time
t;
P
i si(t)=1f o ra l lt.T h e N × N payoﬀ matrix M =( mij) here represents the payoﬀ earned
by each strategy in the population when matched against every other strategy, including itself. For
illustration purposes, we focus here in the simplest cast where M is symmetric, known as the one-
population model. The ﬁtness of strategy i at time t is given by Mis(t), where Mi denotes the row of
the payoﬀ matrix corresponding to strategy i. The idea of assessing how a strategy fares against the
entire population of strategies is what Maynard Smith termed “playing the ﬁeld.” The deterministic




where the denominator can be interpreted as the average ﬁtness level in the entire population of
strategies, including strategy i. The idea of the replicator dynamic is that strategies with above
average ﬁtness see their proportion in the population increase while those with below average ﬁtness
see their proportion in the population decrease. Further, if ˆ s is a Nash equilibrium of the symmetric
game M,t h e ni ti sa l s oaﬁxed point of the replicator dynamic. In the deterministic version of the
replicator dynamic, the proportion of certain strategies can go to zero, i.e. extinction is possible. A
stochastic version of replicator dynamics due to Foster and Young (1990) eliminates extinction, and
can have quite diﬀerent limiting dynamics than the deterministic version.
Friedman (1996) and Cheung and Friedman (1998) have examined the predictions of replicator dy-
namics using data from human subject experiments. Friedman studies the predictions of the replicator
dynamic for equilibrium stability, and Cheung and Friedman compare replicator dynamic predictions
with that of the individual, belief-based, stochastic ﬁctitious play learning algorithm. Most of the
games they study are two player, binary choice games with a unique Nash equilibrium in either mixed
or pure strategies. In such games, the state, s(t)0 =( s1(t),(1 − s1(t)), and the replicator dynamic for







where β > 0 represents an adjustment parameter, and ∆s1(t +1 )=s1(t +1 )− s1(t). Cheung and
Friedman omit the denominator on the right hand side, s(t)0Ms(t), which serves as a normalization
device ensuring that proportions sum up to one; in the binary choice case this device is unnecessary,
and furthermore, Cheung and Friedman report that the unnormalized version ﬁts the data better.
In their experimental design, these authors make some accommodation for the “playing the ﬁeld”
nature of the replicator dynamic; in their “mean matching” treatment, each player is matched against
all other players, receiving the average payoﬀ from his choice of action against that of all others.
The other matching treatment is the standard, random pairwise matching protocol. While game
theory would treat these two environments very diﬀerently, with the ﬁrst corresponding to an n-player
repeated game and the second to a two-player, one-shot game, the only diﬀerence under the replicator
dynamic lies in the greater variance in payoﬀs that players receive in the random pairwise matching
28protocol. Friedman and Cheung and Friedman are careful to address issues concerning group size, the
length of play of a single game, and of the information that players receive, all of which are important
to approximating the environment for which the replicator dynamic was devised.
Cheung and Friedman (1998) use experimental data from the two binary choice games they study
to estimate the linear equation:
∆s1(t +1 ) /s1(t)=α + β[M1s(t) − s(t)0Ms(t)] + γdt + ²
where dt = I(t)[M1s(t) − s(t)0Ms(t)], I(t) = 1 if the mean matching treatment was used, and ² is an
error term. They report that α is typically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, implying a persistent bias
from the pure replicator dynamic, that β is signiﬁcantly positive as is γ. The latter ﬁnding suggests
that the mean matching protocol aids in the speed of adjustment relative to random pairings. In a
head-to-head comparison of the explanatory power of the replicator dynamic versus an individual,
belief learning model — the three parameter weighted ﬁctitious play model of Cheung and Friedman
(1997) described in section 3.2 — Cheung and Friedman report that over the two games they study, the
belief learning model outperforms the replicator dynamic, where performance is measured by either
the root mean squared errors or the mean absolute deviations computed from the three parameter
belief-learning or replicator dynamic model.
This ﬁnding suggests that there is some value to thinking of human players as playing best responses
to beliefs about their opponents’ actions rather than thinking of them as playing a game against nature.
On the other hand, it is less clear that Cheung and Friedman have successfully implemented the
evolutionary game environment germane to the use of replicator dynamics or that such an environment
could be implemented in the laboratory, where budget and time constraints limit the number of
subjects and replications of a treatment that are possible. Further work reconciling the replicator
dynamic with human learning processes is needed.
4.2 Genetic Algorithms
Genetic algorithms (GAs) have been widely used by economists to model learning by populations
of heterogenous, adaptive agents especially following Sargent’s (1993) encouraging assessment and
the subsequent use of GAs by his student, Jasmina Arifovic. These algorithms diﬀer from replicator
dynamics in that they allow for the development of new strategies or decisions that may not have been
included in the initial population. As such, they are, eﬃcient sampling methods most appropriate to
large decision or strategy spaces.
Indeed, genetic algorithms, originally developed by Holland (1975), are stochastic, directed search
algorithms based on principles of population biology.17 These algorithms have been demonstrated to
perform well in large or “rugged” search spaces where classical methods, e.g. grid search or gradient
descent, are either ineﬃcient or susceptible to getting stuck at local optima. While there is wide
v a r i a t i o ni nt h es p e c i ﬁc details of genetic algorithms, there are some general principles and procedures
that are regarded as relatively standard. First, the researcher must specify the objective function of
the genetic algorithm search, the parameter values that will be used to maximize (or minimize) that
objective, and the range of admissible parameter values allowed in the search for an optimum. Second,
vectors of parameters, representing candidate solutions are encoded as strings of ﬁnite length L.T h e
strings are intended to mimic chromosomes, with the individual elements representing genes; hence the
name genetic algorithm. In the earliest implementation of genetic algorithms (e.g., Goldberg (1989)),
17For a complete treatment of genetic algorithms see, e.g., Goldberg (1989) or Michalewicz (1996). Dawid (1999a)
provides a thorough discussion of genetica l g o r i t h m sa sa p p l i e dt oeconomic problems. See also Sargent (1993) and Judd
1998, chapter 8.
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rithms as function optimizers is developed for binary encodings. However, more recently, researchers
have made use of real—valued, character, or tree encodings in place of traditional binary encodings.
Researchers typically work with a population of strings of some ﬁxed size, N. Third, the performance
of each string in the population is evaluated using the objective criterion — this is the string’s ﬁtness.
Fourth, a new generation of N strings is determined using operations that mimic natural selection
and naturally occurring biological processes.
The ﬁrst step in a genetic algorithm, known as selection, is to randomly select N strings from the
existing population in such a way that the ﬁtness of the N randomly selected strings is on average
higher than the average ﬁtness of the population from which they were chosen. This selection op-
eration can be accomplished in many ways, including the biased roulette wheel selection mechanism
originally proposed by Holland, in which the likelihood of selecting a string is proportional to its
relative population-wide ﬁtness or other methods e.g. binary tournaments or rank order lists. The
selection operation is intended to mimic Darwinian survival-of-the-ﬁttest. Once a new set of N strings
has been selected, these strings undergo two main biological operations that mimic genetic inheritance.
The ﬁrst, crossover, typically involves pairing strings and, with some probability, pc, randomly cutting
the two strings at one or more points and swapping elements. Once crossover is applied to all strings,
a second operator, mutation is applied, which involves randomly changing each element in a string
with a (small) probability pm, to another value; in the case of binary strings, a ‘0’ is ﬂipped to a ‘1’
and vice versa. After these operations are complete, the new generation of N s t r i n g si se v a l u a t e da n e w
in terms of ﬁtness and the process of choosing a new generation begins again. The genetic algorithm
is terminated after a set number of generations, G, or after some tolerance criterion based on the
objective function has been satisﬁed. Some pseudo-code for a genetic algorithm is given in Figure 8.
g =0
initialize population of N strings, P(0)
while tolerance criterion remains unmet or g<G
evaluate fitness of strings in P(g)
select N strings for P(g +1 ) based on relative fitness
apply crossover to selected strings
apply mutation to recombined strings
evaluate tolerance criterion
g = g +1
end while
Figure 8: Pseudo-code for a genetic algorithm
The main theoretical result for genetic algorithms is known as the schema theorem (Holland
(1975)). The idea of a schema can be understood by the addition of a don’t care character, *, to
the binary alphabet used to encode strings. A schema is a template characterizing a set of chromo-
somes. For example, the schema of length 5, (*101*) characterizes the set of chromosomes {(11011),
(11010), (01011), (11010) }. The order of a schema is the number of ﬁxed positions; e.g., the order
of the schema in our example is 3. The schema theorem (proved, e.g. in Goldberg (1989)) states
that low-order, above-average (below-average) schema appear exponentially more often (less often) in
subsequent generations of a genetic algorithm. This theorem follows directly from the operation of
ﬁtness-proportional selection. These low-order schema are sometimes refereed to as “building blocks.”
30Crossover plays the role of introducing new schemata and mutation also contributes to variability
while at the same time preventing premature convergence to local optima.
How are the genetic operators to be interpreted when applied to economic systems? Several
authors, e.g., Arifovic (1996), Bullard and Duﬀy (1998) Dawid (1999a) Riechmann (1999, 2001ab),
have oﬀered interpretations. Individual strings can represent either individual agents, or one possible
decision of a single-agent. The selection operation is perhaps the easiest to defend; this operator just
insures that agents or decisions that have worked well in the past are more likely to be chosen in the
future while decisions that have fared poorly are more likely to be discarded. This probabilistic choice
of decisions based on relative payoﬀ or ﬁtness success is similar to stochastic reinforcement learning or
stochastic replicator dynamics. The turnover of population need not be interpreted so literally as one
of birth and death; instead it can be interpreted as a turnover of decisions or ideas among players who
are long-lived. The crossover/recombination operator is easiest to interpret if the population of strings
is viewed as representing individual agents. In that case, crossover can be thought of as communication
between pairs of agents, who exchange bits and piece of ideas, though the population as a whole retains
core principles (low-order schema) that have yielded high payoﬀs in the past. Finally, the mutation
operator can be viewed as representing trembles or experimentation.
A further issue concerns the choice of GA parameters: the number of strings, N, the string
length, the mutation and crossover parameters, pc, pm, etc. Here, the practice has been to adopt
parameterizations that computer scientists have found to perform well on test suites of diﬃcult static
optimization problems. These optimization problems are not ones that are so applicable to the dynamic
settings studied by economists, and so further research into this issue would be of some value.
What about the external validity of simulations using genetic algorithms? Arifovic (1994) was
the ﬁrst to directly compare simulations of a genetic algorithm with the behavior of human subjects
in a controlled laboratory experiment.18 The economic environment studied was a textbook version
of Ezekiel’s (1938) “Cobweb” model of demand and supply for a single good. In this model, market
demand in period t is a decreasing, linear function of current period price, pt, while market supply
in period t is an increasing, linear function of the market price that suppliers expected in period
t − 1 would prevail in period t, Et−1pt; the latter assumption captures the notion that it takes time
(one-period) to produce the good, and makes the model dynamic. Arifovic followed experimental
researchers, Carlson (1968) and Wellford (1989), who adopted Ezekiel’s assumption of naive and
homogeneous expectations, i.e. Et−1pt = pt−1 as a benchmark assumption for expectation formation;
in that case, the equilibrium is stable (unstable) if the ratio of the slope of the supply curve to the slope
of the demand curve, in absolute value, is less than (greater than) unity. Bray and Savin (1986) have
shown in a stochastic version of the linear cobweb model that adaptive learners, running regressions
of prices on past prices, can learn the equilibrium price level in the stable case but not in the unstable
case.19 By contrast, a main ﬁnding of the experimental studies was that groups of subjects generally
converged to a neighborhood of the unique equilibrium regardless of whether that equilibrium was
stable or unstable under the naive expectations assumption. However, the variance of quantities or
prices was much greater and more persistent in the unstable case as compared with the stable case.
Arifovic represented ﬁrms (suppliers) in two ways. In the single-population representation, each
ﬁrm was represented as one of N = 30 strings in a single population. In the multiple population
representation, each of the m ﬁr m si sr e p r e s e n t e db yad i ﬀerent population of 30 strings. In both
18Similarly, Axelrod (1987) sought to determine whether the human-submitted ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy that won his (1984)
prisoner’s dilemma tournament would emerge in a simulation exercise that used a genetic algorithm to evolve strategies
(it did).
19Hommes (1994) studies the more general case where demand is linear and supply is nonlinear. He provides conditions
under which adaptive learning dynamics converge to limit cycles or chaos in the unstable case. Sonnemans et al. (2004)
provide experimental evidence in support of Hommes’ predictions.
31Figure 9: Average quantity in the Cobweb model, unstable case (plus/minus one st. dev.). Left panel:
human subject data, right panel: multiple-population GA simulation (source: Arifovic 1994).
cases, each string in a population represents a decision as to how much a ﬁrm might produce in the
current period, qi(t) ∈ [0, ¯ q], absent knowledge of the market price that will prevail. This decision was
encoded as a string, of length 30, using a binary alphabet; initial ‘bit’ values were randomly determined.
The ﬁtness criterion used was the ﬁrm’s current period proﬁt; to evaluate ﬁtness, strings had to be
decoded to real quantities. In addition to using the standard genetic algorithm operations of selection,
crossover and mutation on the binary strings, Arifovic adopted a fourth operator, which amounted
to an augmented, elitist selection criterion which Arifovic called “election.” Following crossover and
mutation, which yields two new strings from two parent strings, the ﬁtness of the new, oﬀspring
strings is evaluated and compared with the ﬁtness of the parent strings; of this group of four strings,
the two strings with the highest ﬁtness values are allowed to enter the next generation of candidate
solutions. This election operator simply allows the genetic algorithm to converge, asymptotically to a
solution; without it, mutations would lead to persistent heterogeneity in the string population in the
neighborhood of a solution. In the case of the single population representation, Arifovic reported the
average value of qit in the population of 30 strings; in the case of the multiple population simulation,
Arifovic imagined that each ﬁrm randomly chose one of its strings to determine its quantity decision in
each period; she then reported the average of these m quantity decisions. In certain simulations, the
model parameters were chosen to be the same as in one of Wellford’s treatments, including number of
periods, 30, and the number of ﬁrms, m =5 .
Figure 9 shows results for the unstable parameter case; the left panel shows the average quantity
produced (with a 1-standard deviation band) for the human subject experiments and the right panel
shows the same for a simulation of the multiple-population version of the genetic algorithm over
the same number of periods. Both the human subjects and the genetic algorithm converges to a
neighborhood of the equilibrium quantity of 14 though convergence takes longer and is more volatile
in this ‘unstable case’ than in the stable case (not shown). However, the average quantity in the GA
simulation appears to get very close to the equilibrium prediction beginning after period 10 while the
same cannot be said of the experimental data. However, consistent with the experimental evidence,
Arifovic is able to reject the null of diﬀerence between the volatility of prices in the stable and unstable
32cases using the simulation data. These ﬁndings provide some support for the reasonableness of genetic
algorithms as models of adaptive processes.
Several papers explore GA learning in general equilibrium, overlapping generation models of money,
and compare the results with experimental ﬁndings. Arifovic (1996) studies exchange rate volatility in
a two-country, two-currency, two-period overlapping generations model due to Kareken and Wallace
(1981). The details of this model are discussed in LeBaron’s chapter. Arifovic’s main conclusion
is that, counter to the theoretical prediction derived under the rational expectations assumption,
under genetic algorithm learning, the exchange rate displays persistent volatility, which is due to the
persistence of mutation and the election operator.
By contrast, Arifovic (1995) shows that in a single country model, an equilibrium with valued ﬁat
currency and low inﬂation is asymptotically stable under GA learning with persistent mutation and
the election operator in place. The selection by the GA of the stationary, low inﬂation equilibrium,
rather than another high inﬂation, stationary equilibrium is consistent with the laboratory ﬁndings
of Marimon and Sunder (1993). Other, homogeneous an non-evolutionary learning algorithms, such
as recursive least squares learning, fail to converge to the same low inﬂation equilibrium (see, e.g.,
Marcet and Sargent (1989)).
In Arifovic’s work, the strings of the GA encode decisions that agents make, e.g. how much to
consume in the ﬁr s tp e r i o d . T h eG At h e nw o r k st oﬁnd the optimal decision, given feasibility and
budget constraints. In Marimon and Sunder’s (1993, 1994) overlapping generation experiments, sub-
jects were not asked to make consumption/savings decisions as pilot studies suggested that subjects
had a diﬃcult time solving that kind of intertemporal optimization problem. Instead, Marimon and
Sunder asked subjects to provide forecasts of the price level they expected would prevail in the next
period. Given a subject’s forecast, the computer program solved that subject’s optimal consump-
tion/savings allocation and determined market clearing prices. Bullard and Duﬀy (1999) adopted
this same learning-how-to-forecast design in a GA-learning simulation of the environment studied by
Arifovic (1995). They imagine that agents have some belief about how prices in period t +1w i l lb e
related to prices in period t, and the strings of the GA encode this belief. Given the price forecast, the
program optimally determines each agent’s consumption/savings decision, along with market clear-
ing prices. Bullard and Duﬀy (1999) show that this learning-how-to-forecast implementation of GA
learning results in ﬁndings that are consistent with the experimental evidence of Marimon and Sunder
(1994) and also with Arifovic (1995)’s learning-how-to-optimize implementation of GA learning.
Several papers use GAs to understand ﬁndings from auction experiments. A diﬃculty with auctions
is that participants frequently fail to win an item or agree to a transaction, so that the ﬁtness of
strategies may need to be assessed over a longer period of time than is typical in other applications of
GAs.
Andreoni and Miller (1995) use genetic algorithms as a way of studying how close populations
of adaptive agents might come to learning equilibrium bid functions in a variety of auction formats:
ﬁrst and second price aﬃliated-values auctions, ﬁrst and second price private-values auctions, and
common value auctions. The design of their simulation experiments is aligned with that of laboratory
experiments with paid human subjects in several dimensions, e.g., the number of bidders in a group and
the information available to these bidders. However, their 20 simulation runs of 1000 generations per
auction format is more diﬃcult to compare with the 20-30 auctions that human subjects participate in
the typical experiment. In Andreoni and Miller’s implementation, the genetic algorithm is employed
to search over two parameters of a general linear bidding function of the form
b(xi)=βi1xi + βi2²,
where xi is agent (string) i’s valuation and ² is some distribution parameter that varies according
to the knowledge that agents are assumed to have, e.g., whether valuations are private-independent,
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functions that are predicted to obtain in the various auction formats. The binary strings of the GA
encode the two parameters, β1 and β2. For the standard GA implementation, Andreoni and Miller
report that the GA simulations come closest to learning the equilibrium bid functions in the aﬃliated
private value, ﬁrst or second price auction formats and have more diﬃculty achieving the equilibrium
bid functions in the independent-private and common value formats. Consistent with evidence from
human subject experiments, e.g. Cox et al. (1982), Kagel and Levin (1986), they ﬁnd violations
of revenue equivalence between ﬁrst- and second- price auction formats, and they ﬁnd that smaller
groups of 4 rather than 8 bidders are less prone to the winner’s curse in common value auctions.
Dawid (1999b) examines genetic algorithm learning in a sealed bid, double auction market. The
N buyers’ each have some value, v, from consuming a unit of the single good while the N sellers’ have
some cost, c, of producing a unit of the good, and 1 >v>c>0. The strings of the GA encode
the buyers’ bids and the sellers’ asks. In each period, buyer and sellers are randomly paired. If a
buyer’s bid, pb, exceeds a sellers’ ask, pa, a transaction occurs at price p =( pa + pb)/2; otherwise no
transaction occurs. Proﬁts are determined in the usual way, v −p for buyers and p−c for sellers, and
the ﬁtness of buyer/seller rules and application of genetic operators is assessed every m periods. Dawid
shows analytically that the only locally stable equilibria under GA dynamics are those where all buyers
(sellers) submit the same bid (ask) in the interval [v,c]. In 50 simulation runs where v =1a n dc =0 ,
he reports that the most common outcome is a single price equilibrium in a small neighborhood of .5.
Interestingly, this ﬁnding is quite similar to that observed in an experiment conducted by Valley et al.
(2002), where values of v and c are drawn randomly from [0,1] and after learning these values, pairs
of players were allowed to communicate with one another prior to submitting bids/asks. The most
common outcome, in cases where gains from trade are possible (v>c ), was for both buyer and seller
to name the same price. While this experimental ﬁnding may not be so surprising, the fact that the
GA simulation delivers this same ﬁnding, without any explicit communication between populations of
buyers and sellers, is quite interesting.
Finally, there are several papers comparing GA simulations with experimental ﬁndings in labor
markets. Pingle and Tesfatsion (2001) examine the impact of varying levels of non-employment ben-
eﬁts on worker—employer matches and on-the-job cooperation using data from both human subject
experiments and computational experiments that make use of genetic algorithms. The environment
studied is a repeated two-stage game where in the ﬁrst stage workers decide whether (and to which
employer) to work or remain unemployed while employers decide whether to accept these oﬀers or keep
a position vacant. At the end of this ﬁrst stage, unemployed workers and employers with vacancies
receive a ﬁxed non-employment beneﬁt while matched workers and employers proceed to the second
stage, which involves play of a prisoner’s dilemma game, with strategies labeled ‘shirk’ and ‘don’t
shirk.’ The single treatment variable was the size of the non-employment beneﬁt. The human subject
experiments revealed that increases in the non-employment beneﬁt both decreased the frequency with
which relationships formed, and the frequency of mutual cooperation between worker-employer pairs,
though this eﬀect was not monotonic. Further, long-term relationships between the same worker and
employer were rare. The computational labor market had four times as many workers and employers
as the human subject experiment and was simulated for a much longer period of time: 1,000 gen-
erations. Each generation consisted up successive trade cycles followed by an evolutionary step that
updated strategies; the genetic algorithm operates in the latter stage. A trade cycle consisted of both
a matching process, which utilizes a reinforcement learning algorithm to determine the expected util-
ity of potential partners, followed by a work-site interaction among matched players. The work-site
interaction was governed by a ﬁnite state automaton, and the genetic algorithm was used to search
for potentially better work-site rules in the evolution step. Among the ﬁndings from simulations of
this model are that, consistent with the human subject experiments, the frequency of employment
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with the human subject ﬁndings, in the computational experiment, nearly all employers and workers
end up in long-term ﬁxed relationships, and either mutual cooperation or mutual defection becomes
the norm, depending on initial conditions. The authors suggest that these diﬀerences may be owing
to diﬀerences in the design of the two experiments, in particular the diﬀerent number of employers
and workers in the computational versus the human subject experiments appears to have played an
important role in the outcomes, though the diﬀerent time-frames of analysis may also be a contributing
factor.
¨ Unver (2001a) Haruvy et al. (2002) use genetic algorithms to model the two-sided, worker-ﬁrm
matching process in markets for medical intern and federal law clerks and compare these results with
human subject experiments. These entry-level labor markets as well as others, have been susceptible
to a phenomenon known as unraveling, in which the date at which ﬁrms and workers agree to contracts
becomes increasingly earlier in time relative to the actual start-date of employment leading to possible
ineﬃciencies in matches due to unavailability of relevant information. Some markets have sought
to address this problem by having centralized clearinghouses that match workers with ﬁrms. ¨ Unver
studies three centralized matching mechanisms used in British medical-intern markets. Of these three,
two are still in use, though only one of these two is stable in the Gale-Shapley (1962) sense. ¨ Unver uses
GA to encode and model the evolution of worker-ﬁrm strategies under these three mechanisms. Among
other ﬁndings, he shows that the theoretically unstable, “linear programming” matching protocol may
not be susceptible to unraveling under the GA adaptation, which is consistent with the continued
use of this mechanism in the ﬁeld. He is able to corroborate other ﬁndings of two-sided matching
experiments conducted by Kagel and Roth (2000) and ¨ Unver (2001b) that explore the unraveling in
the British medical intern markets.
Haruvy et al. (2002) conduct a parallel experiment with human subjects and with artiﬁcial agents
modeled using a genetic algorithm with the aim of studying two-sided matching in the market for
federal law clerks. Applicants initially decide whether to submit applications to judges of varying
qualities, and judges may in turn accept oﬀers. The grades of applicants, aﬀecting the payoﬀ from
a match are only fully revealed later, during a centralized matching process. Matches not made by
the end of the ﬁrst two periods (years) are, in certain treatments, subject to a centralized match in
period 3 using a stable matching protocol. In the ‘idealized-centralized’ treatment, applicants are
not required to submit oﬀers prior to the centralized match in order to participate in it, while in
the coerced-centralized treatment they are required to submit oﬀers prior to the match. In both
cases, oﬀers accepted prior to the centralized match date are binding, consistent with practice in this
market, though in the idealized treatment, binding oﬀers can be avoided by waiting for the centralized
match. In the human subject experiments, the authors report that many more subjects in the role
of applicants and judges wait for the centralized match under the ‘idealized-centralized’ treatment
than do so under the coerced-centralized treatment, and given the additional information that can be
obtained by waiting, welfare is higher in the former treatment than in the latter. In genetic algorithm
simulations, where the strategies of applicants and judges co-evolve, a similar ﬁnding obtains. Haruvy
et al. are careful to compare their ﬁndings for human subject experiments over the same time-scale
used in the genetic algorithm simulations. They then carry out the genetic algorithm simulation
exercise much further in time, and ﬁnd that this diﬀerence becomes even more pronounced over time.
This seems a reasonable merger of the two technologies they use to understand these matching markets.
As they observe p. 3, “the computations will give us some assurance that our experimental results
are not artifacts of slow learning in the laboratory, while experiments will assure us that the behavior
produced by the genetic algorithms is in fact similar to human behavior.”
The ﬁndings from all of these studies provide some support for the reasonableness of genetic
algorithms as models of adaptive learning by populations of heterogenous agents. Genetic algorithms
35appear best suited for large, complex search spaces where it is more eﬃcient to sample from the set
of possible actions/strategies than to enumerate all possibilities and consider their relative ﬁtness at
every decision step. At the same time, most of the studies treat the genetic algorithm as a kind of black
box generator of new-and-improved decisions or strategies, without much regard to the interpretation
of genetic operators, or how they compare with actual human decision-making processes. Toward this
goal, it would be of interest to consider the marginal contribution of each of the genetic operators in
explaining data from human subjects, an exercise akin to adding additional structure to ZI-algorithms
or moving from reinforcement to hypothetical reinforcement (belief) learning models.
4.3 Comparisons Between Genetic Algorithm and Reinforcement Learning
Two papers have compared the performance of genetic algorithm learning and reinforcement learning in
terms of explaining data from human subject experiments. Haruvy and ¨ Unver (2003) study matching
behavior in procurement-type markets where the matching decision is consequential to both the seller
and the buyer. They are interested in the question of whether buyers and sellers achieve a stable
outcome, ´ a la Gale and Shapley (1962) and if so, whether the stable matching is optimal for the
party who initiates a proposed match (buyers or sellers). As the strategy space in the repeated game
they consider is highly complex, and there are multiple stable outcomes, deductive reasoning is not
very useful and so they turn to inductive reasoning processes, in particular, reinforcement learning
and genetic algorithm learning, to predict what will happen in the experiments they conduct with
human subjects. Both the reinforcement and genetic algorithm learning simulations predict that in
seller— (buyer—) proposing markets, sellers (buyers )a r em o s tl i k e l yt oa c h i e v et h es e l l e r —( b u y e r — )
optimal stable outcome, and this prediction is consistent with the experimental ﬁndings. Aside from
the observation that the two learning models yield the same prediction however, Haruvy and ¨ Unver
do not go into a deeper comparison of the performance of the two learning models.
By contrast, Arifovic and Ledyard (2004) look for a clear winner between reinforcement and genetic
algorithm learning in the context of a repeated public good game that makes use of a Groves-Ledyard
allocation mechanism. As the authors point out, this environment diﬀers from those typically studied
by learning researchers in that the strategy space is continuous. They compare the predictions of
an “individual evolutionary learning” model (a GA—without—crossover for each individual’s strategies)
with Roth-Erev—style reinforcement learning and Camerer and Ho’s (1999) hybrid reinforcement-belief
learning algorithm in terms of the ﬁt of simulations of these models to the experimental data. To
facilitate a comparison, some discretization of the action space is necessary. They report that for two
diﬀerent ways of discretizing the strategy space, reinforcement learning fares substantially worse than
the other two learning approaches in that it takes much longer to converge to the Nash equilibrium
than does the human subjects. However, the version of reinforcement learning they use is not as general
as Roth and Erev allow. For instance, there is no forgetting factor nor is there any spillover in the
probability choice updating to nearby strategies. Given the large strategy space considered, it is not so
surprising that the genetic algorithm appears to perform best for the reasons noted above. However,
before concluding in favor of one approach over others, it would be useful to compare the predictions
of evolutionary and reinforcement—type learning models on a broad range of games including those
with both continuous and discrete strategy sets.
4.4 Classiﬁer Systems
Classiﬁer systems, ﬁrst proposed by Holland (1986), are inductive, rule-based learning systems that
combine reinforcement-type learning over a set of simple logical rules called classiﬁers, with occasional
use of a genetic algorithm search for new classiﬁers. As with genetic algorithms, there are many
36variants, but a typical classiﬁer system consists of four parts: 1) a set of if—then decision rules or
classiﬁers, 2) an accounting system for assessing the strength of classiﬁers and for apportioning credit,
3) an auction system for determining which classiﬁers are invoked and 4) a genetic algorithm for the
introduction of new classiﬁers. Classiﬁe rs y s t e m sa r ep e r h a p sb e s tv i e w e da sm o d e l so fi n d i v i d u a l
learning, akin to expert systems, while genetic algorithms, as typically modeled are often interpreted
as models of population or social learning. As Vriend (2000) points out, the diﬀerences in simulations
of population of classiﬁer systems can yield outcomes that are quite diﬀerent from a single population
genetic algorithm, especially in environments where strategic considerations come into play.20
The ﬁrst use of a classiﬁer system (or a genetic algorithm) in an economic application was due to
Marimon, McGrattan and Sargent (1990), who used a classiﬁer system to model behavior in Kiyotaki
and Wright’s (1989) model of money as a medium of exchange. That model has equal numbers of three
types of agents who produce either good 1, 2 or 3, but who desire to consume another good, e.g. type
1 produces good 2, type 2 produces good 3, and type 3 produces good 1. Each agent may store a single
unit of a good at a time, and the goods have diﬀerent storage costs, with good 1 being the least costly
to store and good 3 being the most costly to store. Agents receive utility from consumption of the good
they desire in an amount that exceeds the highest storage cost. In each period, agents are randomly
paired and decide whether to engage in trade with their match. Trades must be mutually agreed upon
by both parties, in which case inventories of the two goods are swapped otherwise, inventories of goods
do not change. Agents earn utility only when they trade for the good they desire; in that case they
immediately produce a new unit of their production good. In every period they incur storage costs
base on the type of good they hold in inventory. The optimal trading strategy for a type 2 or 3 player
is a fundamental, cost-reducing pure strategy in which they agree (refuse) to trade the good they hold
in storage for less (more) costly—to—store goods in route to getting the good they desire to consume.
On the other hand, depending on parameter values, type 1 players may ﬁnd it optimal to adopt the
fundamental strategy, or a speculative strategy in which they trade their production good 2 for the
more costly to store good 3 with the rational expectation that speculating in the more costly to store
good 3 will reduce the time it takes to acquire the good they desire, good 1.
In Marimon et al.’s implementation, there are two classiﬁer systems for every agent, a set of trade
and consumption classiﬁers represented by strings. The trade classiﬁer takes as input the good an
agent has in storage and the good that his match has in storage, and provides, as output, a decision
(or message) of whether to trade or not. The consumption classiﬁer takes as input the good a player
has in storage and provides as output, a decision (message) of whether or not to consume that good.
Each classiﬁer has a strength or ﬁtness measure associated with it. In each period, the collection
of classiﬁers that satisfy the current state for an agent, consisting of the good the agent holds in
storage and the good in storage of the matched player, bid a fraction of their current strengths in an
auction that determines which classiﬁer the agent adopts; the highest bidding classiﬁer of each type is
chosen, its bid is deducted from its strength and its decision is implemented. The bid of the winning
exchange classiﬁer in the current period is paid to (added to the strength of) the previous period’s
winning consumption classiﬁer, which determined the current good the agent holds in storage, while
the bid of the winning consumption classiﬁer is paid to current period winning exchange classiﬁer,
which determine the good the agent holds in storage. This payment system is what Holland termed
a ‘bucket brigade’ wherein classiﬁers that are not necessarily active in the current period, but which
were critical for activating classiﬁers that were active can still earn some share of credit and see their
strengths improve. The current winning consumption classiﬁer earns the ‘external’ payoﬀ associated
with its decision, which depends on whether the good in storage is the desired good or not. Finally
a genetic algorithm is called on, with some decreasing frequency, to generate new classiﬁers, with
20For a further discussion of this issue see, e.g. Riechmann (2002) and Arifovic and Maschek (2004).
37the population of parent strings being selected from the population of classiﬁers according to relative
strengths. The set of strings resulting from the genetic operators are assigned the strengths of the
parent strings.
In simulations of this system, Marimon et al. report many interesting ﬁndings, but the main ﬁnding
is that speculative trading strategies (e.g. by type 1 players) are not observed in environments where
in equilibrium, they would comprise a unique best response. Marimon et al. comment on this ﬁnding
by observing that the behavior of the artiﬁcial agents, modeled using classiﬁer systems, can be very
myopic in the beginning, while it may take time for some optimal strategies, such as speculation, to
achieve strengths that will sustain these strategies. They conclude that “the present algorithm seems
defective in that it has too little experimentation to support the speculative equilibrium even in the
long simulations we have run.” 21
Inspired by Marimon et al.’s simulation ﬁndings, Duﬀy and Ochs (1999, 2002) sought to test the
Kiyotaki-Wright model in a laboratory experiment. They made an eﬀort to provide subjects with all
the information relevant in to making optimal decisions in the theoretical environment. Duﬀya n d
Ochs sought to induce a stationary inﬁnite horizon, as the theory presumes, by having an indeﬁnite
end to a sequence of pairwise trading rounds. Such concerns with implementation of inﬁnite horizons
do not typically concern agent-based modelers, as the artiﬁcial agents in their models are not typically
forward-looking, alleviating concerns about backward induction due to end-game eﬀects. Finally,
among the parameterizations they chose was one that was also used by Marimon et al. (1990).
Though Duﬀy and Ochs had only 8 or 10 agents of each of the three types, while Marimon et al.
had 50, the ﬁndings from the human subject experiments were quite similar to those obtained in
the artiﬁcial agent simulations using classiﬁer systems. In particular, Duﬀy and Ochs also ﬁnd that
subjects failed to adopt speculative trading strategies in environments where such strategies comprise
an equilibrium best response.22
Duﬀy (2001) considers two alterations of the Kiyotaki-Wright model that might serve to promote
the adoption of speculative strategies. In one version, agents whose optimal equilibrium strategy
calls for speculation are given more encounters with situations where playing the speculative strategy
results in higher expected utility. In the other, two of the three agent types are constrained to playing
the strategies that are optimal for them in equilibrium. Duﬀy adopts a reinforcement learning model
which is similar to the exchange classiﬁer of Marimon et al. (1990), automates the consumption
classiﬁer and gets rid of the genetic algorithm. A similar model was found to provide a good ﬁtt o
the experimental data of Duﬀy and Ochs (1999). Duﬀy uses this reinforcement model to simulate
what will happen in the two alternative environments, and reports that both alternatives speed up
the learning of speculative strategies. However, the adoption of speculative strategies is greater in the
second alternative, where two thirds of the agent types are constrained to playing optimal strategies.
He then conducts an experiment with human subjects designed to test these same alternatives. In
the human subject experiment, the model parameters, the number of agents, and other features of
the environment are kept as similar as possible to that of the simulated environments to facilitate
comparisons. The human subject ﬁndings are largely consistent with the artiﬁcial agent ﬁndings.
Duﬀy stresses that agent-based modeling exercises of this type can be a useful tool for experimental
design, and at the same time, the results of human subject experiments might be useful in thinking
21Subsequent applications of classiﬁer systems in economic applications, include Basci (1999), Beltrametti, et al.
(1997), Vriend (2000). LeBaron’s chapter discusses the Santa Fe artiﬁcial stock market (Arthur et al. (1997)) which
makes use of a classiﬁer system to model traders’ decisions. See Lettau and Uhlig (1999) for a comparison between
classiﬁer/rule learning and dynamic programming.
22B r o w n( 1 9 9 6 )c o n d u c t e da ne x p e r i m e n t a lt e s to ft h eK i y o t a k i - W r i g h tt h a tw a sm o r en a r r o w l yf o c u s e do nt h es p e c -
ulative equilibrium prediction and came to the same conclusion: most subjects failed to adopt the speculative trading
strategy.
38about how to model the decisions of artiﬁcial agents.
4.5 Genetic Programming
Another variant of genetic algorithm learning is known as genetic programming developed by Koza
(1992). In genetic programming, the same genetic operators of the GA are used to search over a
population self-executing computer programs represented as decision trees (variable—length strings)
in an eﬀort to obtain an optimal functional relationship or program. This type of genetic search is
well-suited to ﬁnding functional solutions to problems that do not readily yield closed-form solutions.
Genetic programming has been mainly used by economists to study ﬁnancial market phenomena, e.g.
to uncover technical trading rules or to discover pricing formulas for ﬁnancial derivatives. Chen (2002)
provides a good survey.
However, the external validity of genetic programming has been assessed through a few comparisons
with the results of human subject experiments. Perhaps the best known work is that of Chen and Yeh
(1996), who revisit the unstable cobweb model studied by Arifovic (1994) and examined experimentally
by Wellford (1989). Chen and Yeh note that it is more general to view agents as learning a functional
relationship for prices, e.g. Et−1pt = f(pt−1,p t−2...) than for them to be learning about what quantity
to produce as in Arifovic’s (1994) implementation, as the former approach allows for the possibility
that the equilibrium is not a ﬁxed point, e.g. it could be a limit cycle. Chen and Yeh apply a genetic
programming algorithm to search over a class of price forecast functions. Essentially the algorithm
allows for a wide range of linear and nonlinear functions mapping from observations on as many as
10 past prices to deliver a forecast for period t. These forecast functions determine quantities which
subsequently determine actual market prices via the equilibrium market clearing condition. Fitness of
individual forecast functions is then assessed, and genetic operations are applied to advance the search
for better price forecast functions in a manner analogous to the genetic algorithm search. Chen and Yeh
report that for the same unstable parameterization of the model considered by Arifovic and Wellford,
(as well as for some even more egregious cases) their genetic programming algorithm has no diﬃculty
yielding price predictions that were very close to the equilibrium price level without the need for an
election operator to contain the eﬀects of the mutation operator. The price forecasting functions are
initially quite complex and diﬃcult to interpret. However, as convergence to the equilibrium obtains,
the price forecasting functions become quite simple, as prices cease to vary so much.23
In a quite diﬀerent application, Duﬀy and Engle-Warnick (2002) use genetic programming to infer
the strategies that human subjects play in a simple bargaining game, given only the actions and
histories of the players. This approach, which Koza (1992) termed “symbolic regression” involves
evaluation of a population of computer programs in terms of their relative success in mapping from
inputs, e.g. players’ histories, to output, e.g. player’s action choices. An advantage of this approach is
that the user does not have to specify the functional form of the strategy model in advance, aside from
specifying a set of model primitives; both the form and the coeﬃcients of the computer programs are
estimated simultaneously. Using this algorithm, Duﬀy and Engle-Warnick report that simple threshold
strategies characterize the behavior of most of the human subject participants.
23Chen et al. (2002) use a genetic programming algori t h mt or e a c has i m i l a rc o n c l u s i o ni nam e d i a ne ﬀort coordination
game studied experimentally by Van Huyck et al. (1994). Chen et al. show that a steady state eﬀort level that is
theoretically unstable under a myopic, homogeneous best—response learning dynamic turns out to be stable under the
genetic—programming—based learning system in accordance with Van Huyck et al.’s (1994) ﬁnding from human subject
experiments.
394.6 Summary
Evolutionary algorithms, by contrast with ZI and individual learning algorithms, are derived from
principles of population biology. While the principle of survival and propagation based on relative
ﬁtness is similar to reinforcement learning, ﬁtness assessments in evolutionary algorithms are not made
on the basis of an individual agent or strategy’s own history, but instead are based on population-wide
measures. The biological models from which evolutionary algorithms derive lead to some diﬃculties
of interpretation for social scientists. While some eﬀorts have been made to interpret the operators
of evolutionary algorithms, the more common approach has been to treat these algorithms as a kind
of black box model of social learning, and focus on the similarity between aggregate outcomes in
simulations and in human subject experiments.
Two main approaches in evolutionary models have been identiﬁed. With the replicator dynamic,
the set of strategies or actions must be fully speciﬁed at the outset. Such an approach is reasonable in
environments where the set of actions or strategies is small. In environments where the search space
is larger, a genetic algorithm approach may be preferred. GAs are eﬀective, population-based search
algorithms that optimize on the tradeoﬀ between ﬁnding new strategies, and exploiting strategies that
have worked well in the past.
Comparisons between simulations using evolutionary algorithms and human subject experiments
suggest that there is some support for the use of evolutionary algorithms as models of population
learning. However, the time-frame and the number of agents used in simulation of evolution algorithms
is often quite diﬀerent from that adopted in human subject experiments.
5 Conclusions and Directions for the Future
Two parallel computer-based technologies, the experimental and the computational laboratory, have
begun to have a major impact on economic research. While top-down, deductive theorizing with
fully rational agents remains the standard in economics, the ﬁndings of experimentalists and ACE re-
searchers using bottom—up, boundedly rational, inductive models of behavior are attracting increasing
attention in the profession, as these models often provide a better ﬁt to experimental (as well as to
ﬁeld) data, and operate without the centralized coordinating devices found in standard theory.
There are diﬃculties with the external validity of both approaches. Agent-based models have many
degrees of freedom, experimental methods are unable to perfectly induce or control subject behavior,
etc. Still, the fact that ﬁndings from agent-based models and human subject experiments are often in
agreement helps to allay concerns with either approach individually. Can an argument be made for one
approach over the other? Analagous to Judd’s (1997) answer to the question of whether computational
economics and economic theory are substitutes or complements, we have seen that agent-based models
and humans subject experiments are sometimes nearly perfect substitutes (e.g. zero intelligent agents
in certain versions of the double auction market) but are more often complements (e.g. the degree of
sophistication in individual learning models can be calibrated based on experimental data).
There are several directions for future research. First, further comparisons of diﬀerent agent-based
models using a variety of experimental data sets are needed. “Horse-races” such as those between
reinforcement learning and belief-learning and between belief-learning and replicator dynamics are
important for choosing among agent-based modeling approaches. Second, further parallel experiments
with human and artiﬁcial agents situated in the same environment are needed to better understand
the external validity of agent-based models as well as to appropriately calibrate those models. These
parallel experiments will necessarily involve more constraints on agent-based modeling exercises than
on human subject designs owing to the stricter time and budget constraints of laboratory research.
However, if agent-based models can accurately track the behavior of human subjects over the short-
40time frame of a human subject experiment, that ﬁnding would give the ACE researcher a license to
carry out simulations of the model over a much longer time-frame, as might be necessary to achieve
convergence to an equilibrium. Third, new agent-based models might be developed based on laboratory
evidence. There are at least two possibilities for attacking this goal. Researchers could seek to
determine how players go about analyzing the experimental environments in which they are placed.
For example, the kind of information subjects consider, their cognitive skills and other characteristics
that Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) have termed the players’ strategic sophistication. Costa-Gomes et
al.’s use of the Mouselab software which enables the researcher to study the information that players
consider in playing normal form games, as well as Camerer et al.’s (1993) use of the Mouselab software
to study behavior in extensive form games, is very useful in identifying heterogeneity of player types,
and testing cognitive concepts such as backward induction.
A second possibility for designing empirically grounded agent-based models is to make greater use
of an experimental design known as the strategy method, ﬁrst proposed by Selten (1967). The strategy
method requires subjects to simultaneously specify, prior to the start of a game, the strategies they
will play in the game, i.e. their action choice at every information set. Subjects’ choices are then made
for them based on the strategies they submitted.24 Unlike observing how players make decisions as a
game unfolds in real-time and attempting to infer subjects’ strategies from their action choices, the
strategy method provides researchers with the all the information necessary to program artiﬁcial agent
strategies.25 In more complex environments, it may be necessary to give subjects experience with the
game prior to having them submit strategies. For instance, Selten et al. (1997) have subjects play a
Cournot duopoly game repeatedly and then ask them to program their strategies. The programmed
strategies were then played against one another and the programmers were allowed to alter their
strategies based on their performance. The adoption of such an approach might well lead to the
development of new adaptive models with a greater claim to the term ‘agent-based.’
24The counterpart of the strategy method in the agent-based literature is to hold a tournament ´ a la Axelrod (1984),
asking researchers to submit strategies, or computer code that characterize the behavior of artiﬁcial agents and to use
some matching protocol or test suite of problems/data to determine a winning strategy/program. (See, e.g. the Trading
Agent Competition, http://www.sics.se/tac/ or The Turing Tournament, http://turing.ssel.caltech.edu/ ). However,
tournaments, especially the winner-take-all variety, may alter incentives so that the stratgies/programs submitted do not
reﬂect decisions agents would make in non-tournament environments, e.g. in random-pairwise interactions. For instance,
winner-take-all tournaments might give rise to a higher variance in payoﬀs than simple random pair—wise interactions.
If there is free entry/exit into a tournament (as is typically the case), then one might expect tournament participants
to have a higher tolerance for risk than would agents interacting in random pairwise encounters, so that tournament
ﬁndings could be misleading for agent-based modelers. Further, tournaments are expensive to run, and are infrequently
conducted more than once. By contrast, eliciting strategies from human subjects in non-tournament environments is
relatively cheap and can be done repeatedly.
25Some researchers believe that the strategy method changes the way players play a game. The experimental evidence
on this question is mixed. See, e.g. Brandts and Charness (2000) and Brosig et al. (2003).
41References
Andreoni, J. and J.H. Miller (1995), “Auctions with Artiﬁcial Adaptive Agents,” Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior 58, 211—221.
Arifovic, J. (1994), “Genetic Algorithm Learning and the Cobweb Model,” Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 18(1), 3-28.
Arifovic, J. (1995), “Genetic Algorithms and Inﬂationary Economies,” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 36(1), 219-43.
Arifovic, J. (1996), “The Behavior of the Exchange Rate in the Genetic Algorithm and Experimental
Economies,” Journal of Political Economy 104(3), 510-41.
Arifovic, J. and J. Ledyard (2004), “Scaling Up Learning Models in Public Good Games,” Journal
of Public Economic Theory 6, 203—238.
Arifovic, J. and M.K. Maschek (2004), “Social vs. Individual Learning — What Makes a Diﬀerence?”
working paper, Simon Fraser University.
Arthur, W.B. (1991), “Designing Economic Agents That Act Like Human Agents: A Behavioral
Approach to Bounded Rationality,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 81(2),
353-59.
Arthur, W.B. (1993), “On Designing Economic Agents That Behave Like Human Agents,” Journal
of Evolutionary Economics 3(1): 1-22.
Arthur, W.B. (1994), “Inductive reasoning and bounded rationality” American Economic Review
Papers and Proceedings 84, 406—411.
Arthur, W.B., J.H. Holland, B. LeBaron, R. Palmer and P. Taylor (1997), “Asset Pricing Under
Endogenous Expectations in an Artiﬁcial Stock Market,” in W.B. Arthur, et al. (Eds.) The
Economy as an Evolving Complex System II, Reading, MA: Addison—Wesley, 15—44.
Axelrod, R. (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books.
Axelrod, R. (1987), “The Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma,” in L. Davis,
ed. Genetic Algorithms and Simulated Annealing, Los Alamos, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.
Axelrod, R. (1997), The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent—Based Models of Competition and Col-
laboration, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Basci, E. (1999), “Learning by Imitation,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 23(9-10),
1569-85.
Battalio, R., L. Samuelson and J. Van Huyck (2001), “Optimization Incentives and Coordination
Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games,” Econometrica 69, 749—764.
Batten, D.F. (2000), Discovering Artiﬁcial Economics: How Agents Learn and Economies Evolve,
Boulder: Westview Press.
Beltrametti, L. et al. (1997) “A Learning-To-Forecast Experiment on the Foreign Exchange Market
with a Classiﬁer System,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 21(8-9), 1543-75.
42Bendor, J., D. Mookherjee and D. Ray (2001), “Aspiration-based Reinforcement Learning in Re-
peated Interaction Games: An Overview,” International Game Theory Review 3, 159—174.
Bendor, J., D. Diermeir, and M. Ting (2003) “A Behavioral Model of Turnout,” American Political
Science Review 97, 261—280.
Bereby—Meyer, Y. and I. Erev (1998) “On Learning to Become a Successful Loser: A Comparison of
Alternative Abstractions of Learning in the Loss Domain,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology
42.
Bereby—Meyer, Y., I. Erev, and A.E. Roth (1999) “The Eﬀe c to fA d d i n gaC o n s t a n tt oA l lP a y o ﬀs:
Experimental Investigation and Implications for Reinforcement Learning Models,” Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization 39, 111-128.
Blume, A., D.V. DeJong, G.R. Neumann, and N.E. Savin (2002) “Learning and Communication in
Sender—Receiver Games: An Econometric Investigation,” Journal of Applied Econometrics 17,
225—247.
B¨ orgers and Sarin (2000), “Naive Reinforcement Learning with Endogenous Aspirations,” Interna-
tional Economic Review 41, 921-50.
Bosch-Dom´ enech, A. and S. Sunder (2001) “Tracking the Invisible Hand: Convergence of Double
Auctions to Competitive Equilibrium,” Computational Economics 16(3), 257-84.
Bottazzi, G., G. Devetag and G. Dosi (2003), “Adaptive Learning and Emergent Coordination in
Minority Games in R. Cowan and N. Jonard Eds. Heterogeneous Agents, Interactions and
Economic Performance, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 521, Berlin:
Springer—Verlag.
Bower, J. and D. Bunn, “Experimental Analysis of the Eﬃciency of Uniform-Price versus Discrimi-
natory Auctions in the England and Wales Electricity Market,” Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 25(3-4), 561-92.
Boylan, R.T. and M.A. El-Gamal (1993), “Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic
Experiments,” Games and Economic Behavior 5, 205—222.
Bray, M.M. and N.E. Savin (1986), “Rational Expectations Equilibria, Learning, and Model Speciﬁ-
cation,” Econometrica 54, 1129-60.
Brandts, J. and G. Charness (2000), “Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability
in Experimental Games,” Experimental Economics 2, 227—238.
Brenner, T. (1999), Modelling learning in economics, Northampton, MA: Elgar.
Brewer, P.J., M. Huang, B. Nelson, and C.R. Plott (2002), “On the Behavioral Foundations of
the Law of Supply and Demand: Human Convergence and Robot Randomness,” Experimental
Economics 5(3), 179-208.
Brosig, J., J. Weimann and C—L. Yang (2003), “The Hot Versus Cold Eﬀect in a Simple Bargaining
Experiment,” Experimental Economics 6, 75—90.
Brown, G.W. (1951), “Iterative Solution of Games by Fictitious Play,” in Activity Analysis of Pro-
duction and Allocation, T. Koopmans, ed., New York: Wiley, 374-376.
43Brown, P., (1996), “Experimental Evidence on Money as a Medium of Exchange,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Dynamics and Control 20, 583-600.
Brown-Kruse, J.L. (1991) “Contestability in the presence of an alternative market: An experimental
examination,” Rand Journal of Economics 22: 136—147.
Bullard, J. and J. Duﬀy (1998), “A Model of Learning and Emulation with Artiﬁcial Adaptive
Agents,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 22, 179-207.
Bullard, J. and J. Duﬀy (1999), “Using Genetic Algorithms to Model the Evolution of Heterogeneous
Beliefs,” Computational Economics, 13(1), 41-60
Bush, R.R. and F. Mosteller (1955), Stochastic Models for Learning New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Camerer, C. (2003), Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction, Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Camerer, C. and T-H. Ho (1999), “Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games,”
Econometrica 67, 827-74.
Camerer, C. E. Johnson, T. Rymon and S. Sen (1993), “Cognition and Framing in Sequential Bar-
gaining for Gains and Losses,” in K. Binmore, et al., eds. Frontiers of Game Theory, Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 27—47.
Carlson, J. (1968) “An Invariably Stable Cobweb Model,” Review of Economic Studies 35, 360-362.
Chamberlin, E.H. (1948), “An Experimental Imperfect Market,” Journal of Political Economy 56,
95-108.
Chan, N.T., B. LeBaron, A.W. Lo and T. Poggio (1999), “Agent-Based Models of Financial Markets:
A Comparion with Experimental Markets,” working paper.
Chen, S.H., J. Duﬀy and C.H. Yeh (2002), “Equilibrium Selection via Adaptation: Using Genetic Pro-
gramming to Model Learning in a Coordination Game,” The Electronic Journal of Evolutionary
Modelling and Economic Dynamics http://e-jemed.org article 1002.
Chen, S.H. and C.H. Yeh (1996), “Genetic Programming Learning and the Cobweb Model,” in P.J.
Angeline and K.E. Kinnear Jr. (Eds.), Advances in Genetic Programming 2, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 443—466.
Chen, S.H. (2002), Genetic Algorithms and Genetic Programming in Computational Finance,D o r -
drecht: Kluwer.
Cheung, Y-W. and D. Friedman (1997) “Learning in evolutionary games: some laboratory results,”
Games and Economic Behavior 19, 46—76.
Cheung, Y-W. and D. Friedman (1998) “A comparison of learning and replicator dynamics using
experimental data,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 35, 263—280.
Cliﬀ, D. and J. Bruten (1997a). “Minimal—intelligence agents for bargaining behaviors in market-
based environments,” Technical report HP-97-91, Hewlett—Packard Research Labs, Bristol, Eng-
land.
44Cliﬀ, D. and J. Bruten (1997b), “More than Zero Intelligence Needed for Continuous Double-Auction
Trading,” Hewlett Packard Laboratories Paper HPL-97-157, Bristol, England.
Coursey, D., R.M. Issac, M. Luke and V.L. Smith (1984) “Market contestability in the presence of
sunk (entry) costs,” Rand Journal of Economics 15: 69-84.
Costa-Gomes, M., V. Crawford and B. Broseta (2001), “Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form
Games: An Experimental Study,” Econometrica 69, 1193—1235.
Crockett, S. (2004) “Learning Competitive Equilibrium in Experimental Exchange Economies,” work-
ing paper, Carnegie—Mellon University
Crockett, S., S. Spear, and S. Sunder (2004) “A Simple Decentralized Institution for Learning Com-
petitive Equilibrium,” working paper, Carnegie—Mellon and Yale Universities.
Cross, J.G., (1983), A Theory of Adaptive Economic Behavior, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Cyert, R.M. and J.G. March (1956) “Organizational Factors in the Theory of Oligopoly,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 70, 44-64.
Davis, D.D. and C.A. Holt (1993) Experimental Economics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Dawid, Herbert (1999a) Adaptive Learning by Genetic Algorithms: Analytical Results and Applica-
tions to Economic Models, second revised and enlarged edition Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Dawid, H. (1999b), “On the Convergence of Genetic Learning in a Double Auction Market,” Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control 23, 1545—1569.
Duﬀy, J. (2001), “Learning to Speculate: Experiments with Artiﬁcial and Real Agents,” Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control 25(3-4), 295-319.
Duﬀy, J. and J. Engle-Warnick (2002), “Using Symbolic Regression to Infer Strategies from Exper-
imental Data,” in S.H. Chen, Ed., Evoluationary Computation in Economics and Finance New
York: Physica-Verlag, 61—82.
Duﬀy, J. and E. Hopkins (2004) “Learning, Information and Sorting in Market Entry Games: Theory
and Evidence,” forthcoming, Games and Economic Behavior.
Duﬀy, J. and J. Ochs (1999), “Emergence of Money as a Medium of Exchange: An Experimental
Study,” American Economic Review 89(4), 847-77.
Duﬀy, J. and J. Ochs (2002), “Intrinsically worthless objects as media of exchange: experimental
evidence,” International Economic Review.
Duﬀy, J. and M.U. ¨ Unver (2005), “Asset Price Bubbles and Crashes With Near Zero—Intelligence
Traders,” forthcoming in Economic Theory.
Ellison, G. (1993), “Learning, Local Interaction and Coordination,” Econometrica 61, 1047-1071.
Easley, D. and J.O. Ledyard (1993) “Theories of Price Formation and Exchange in Double Oral
Auctions,” in D. Friedman and J. Rust (Eds.) The Double Auction Market, Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley, 63—97.
45Engle-Warnick, J. and R. Slonim (2002), “Inferring Repeated Game Strategies From Actions: Evi-
dence from Trust Game Experiments,” working paper.
Epstein, J.M. and R. Axtell (1996), Growing Artiﬁcial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Erev, I. and G. Barron (2003) “On Adaptation, Maximization and Reinforcement Learning Among
Cognitive Strategies,” working paper, Technion and Harvard Universities.
Erev, I., and A. Rapoport (1998), “Coordination, ”Magic,” and Reinforcement Learning in a Market
Entry Game Games and Economic Behavior 23(2), 146-75.
Erev, I. and A.E. Roth (1998), “Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in
Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria, American Economic Review 88(4),
848—881.
Ezekiel, M. (1938), “The Cobweb Theorem,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 52, 255-280.
Feltovich, N. (2000) “Reinforcement—Based vs. Belief—Based Learning Models in Experimental As-
symetric Information Games,” Econometrica 68, 605—641.
Franke, R. (2003) “Reinforcement Learning in the El Farol Model,” Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization 51, 367-388.
Friedman (1991) “A Simple Testable Model of Double Auction Markets,” Journal of Economic Be-
havior and Organization 15, 47-70.
Friedman (1996) “Equilibrium in evolutionary games: some experimental results,” Economic Journal
106, 1—25.
Foster, D. and H.P. Young (1990), “Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics,” Theoretical Popula-
tion Biology 38, 219—232.
Fudenberg, D. and D.K. Levine (1998), The Theory of Learning in Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Gjerstad, S. and J. Dickhaut (1998), Price formation in double auctions, Games and Economic
Behavior 22, 1—29.
Gode, D.K. and S. Sunder (1993), “Allocative Eﬃciency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders:
Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality,” Journal of Political Economy 101(1),
119—137.
Gode, D.K. and S. Sunder (1997a), “What Makes Markets Allocationally Eﬃcient?” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 112, 603—630.
Gode, D.K. and S. Sunder (1997b), “Lower Bounds for Eﬃciency of Surplus Extraction in Double
Auctions,” in The Double Auction Market Institutions Theories, and Evidence Santa Fe Institute
Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Vol. 14, Reading, MA: Addison—Wesley.
Gode, D.K. and S. Sunder (2004), “Double auction dynamics: structural eﬀects of non-binding price
controls,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 28, 1707—1731.
46Gode, D.K., S.E. Spear and S. Sunder (2000), “Convergence of Double Auctions to Competitive
Equilibrium in Edgeworth Box,” working paper.
Goldberg, D.E. (1989) Genetic Algorithms in Search, Optimization, and Machine Learning. Reading,
MA: Addison—Wesley.
Haruvy, E. and M.U. ¨ Unver (2003) “Equilibrium Selection in Repeated B2B Matching Markets,”
working paper, University of Texas, Dallas and Koc University.
Haruvy, E. A.E. Roth and M.U. ¨ Unver (2002), “The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An Ex-
perimental and Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market,” working
paper.
Haruvy, E. and D.O. Stahl (2004), “Deductive Versus Inductive Equilibrium Selection: Experimental
Results,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 53, 319-331.
Ho, T-H., C. Camerer, J-K. Chong (2002) “Economic Value of EWA Lite: A Functional Theory of
Learning in Games,” Working paper.
Hofbauer, J. and K. Sigmund (1988), The Theory of Evolution and Dynamical Systems : Mathemat-
ical Aspects of Selection, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Hofbauer, J. and K. Sigmund (1998), Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics, Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Holland, J.H. (1975), Adaptation in Natural and Artiﬁcial Systems. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press.
Holland, J.H. (1986), “Escaping Brittleness: The Possibilities of General Purpose Learning Algo-
rithms Applied to Parallel Rule-Based Systems,” in Machine Learning: An Artiﬁcial Intelligence
Approach, ed. R.S. Michalski. J.G. Carbonell and T.M. Mitchell. Los Altos, CA: Morgan
Kaufmann.
Hommes, C.H. (1994), “Dynamics of the Cobweb Model With Adaptive Expectations and Nonlinear
Supply and Demand,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 24, 315-335.
Hopkins, E. (2002), “Two Competing Models of How Agents Learn in Games,” Econometrica 70,
2141—2166.
Issac, R.M. and C.R. Plott (1981), “Price Controls and the Behavior of Auction Markets: An Ex-
perimental Evaluation,” American Economic Review 71, 448—459.
Huck, S., K.A. Konrad, W. M¨ uller, and H-T. Normann (2002) “Mergers and the Perception of Market
Power,” working paper, University College London.
Judd, K. L. (1997), “Computational Economics and Economic Theory: Substitutes or Comple-
ments?” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, June 1997 21(6), 907-42.
Judd, K.L. (1998), Numerical Methods in Economics Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kaelbling, L.P., M.L. Littman, and A.W. Moore (1996), “Reinforcement Learning: A Survey,” Jour-
nal of Artiﬁcial Intelligence Research 4, 237—285.
47Kagel, J.H., R.M. Harstad and D. Levin (1987), “Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auc-
tions with Aﬃliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study,” Econometrica, 55, 1275-1304.
Kagel, J.H. and A.E. Roth (1995), The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press.
Kagel, J.H. and A.E. Roth (2000) “The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Labo-
ratory Experiment Motivated by a Natural Experiment,” Quarterly-Journal-of-Economics 115,
201-35
Kandori, M., G.J. Mailath and R. Rob (1993), “Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in
Games,” Econometrica 61(1), 29-56.
Kiyotaki, N. and Wright, R. (1989), “On Money as a Medium of Exchange,” Journal of Political
Economy 97, 927—954.
Karandikar, R., D. Mookherjee, D. Ray and F. Vega-Redondo (1998), “Evolving Aspirations and
Cooperation,” Journal of Economic Theory 80, 292-331.
Kareken, J.H. and N. Wallace (1981), “On the Indeterminacy of Equilibrium Exchange Rates,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 96, 207-22.
Koza, J.R. (1992), Genetic Programming, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kutschinski, E., T. Uthmann, and D. Polani (2003), “Learning Competitive Pricing Strategies by
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 27, 2207-
2218.
Lane, David A. (1993), “Artiﬁcial Worlds and Economics, Part II,” Journal of Evolutionary Eco-
nomics, 3(3), 177-97
Lettau, M. and H. Uhlig, (1999), “Rules of Thumb versus Dynamic Programming,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 89(1), 148-74.
Lucas, R.E. (1986), “Adaptive Behavior and Economic Theory,” Journal of Business 59, S401—S426.
Marimon, R., E. McGrattan, and T.J. Sargent (1990), “Money as a Medium of Exchange in an
Economy with Artiﬁcially Intelligent Agents,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 14,
329—373.
Marimon, R. and S. Sunder (1994), “Expectations and Learning under Alternative Monetary Regimes:
An Experimental Approach,” Economic Theory 4, 131-62.
Marimon, R. and S. Sunder (1993), “Indeterminacy of Equilibria in a Hyperinﬂationary World:
Experimental Evidence,” Econometrica 61, 1073-1107.
Michalewicz, Z. (1996) Genetic Algorithms + Data Structures = Evolution Programs, Thrid Ed.,
Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Miller, R.M. (2002), Paving Wall Street: Experimental Economics and the Quest for the Perfect
Market, New York: John Wiley.
Mirowski, P. (2002), Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
48Mitchell, T.M. (1997), Machine Learning, New York: McGraw Hill.
Morris, S. (2000), “Contagion,” Review of Economic Studies 67, 57—78.
Mookherjee, D. and B. Sopher (1997), “Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum
Games, Games and Economic Behavior 19, 97-132.
Mookherjee, D. and B. Sopher (1994), “Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies
Game,” Games and Economic Behavior 7, 62-91.
Nicolaisen, J., V. Petrov and L. Tesfatsion (2001) “Market Power and Eﬃciency in a Computa-
tional Electricity Market with Discriminatory Double Auction Pricing,” IEEE Transactions on
Evolutionary Computation, 5, 504-523
Nyarko, Y. and A. Schotter (2002), “An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Be-
liefs,” Econometrica 70, 971—1005.
Ochs, J. (1995), “Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria: An Experimental Study,” Games
and Economic Behavior 10, 202-17.
Pemantle, R. and B. Skyrms (2003) “Network Formation by Reinforcement Learning: The Long and
Medium Run,” Working Paper, UC Irivne.
Pingle, M. and L. Tesfatsion (2001), “Non-Employment Payoﬀs and the Evolution of Worker-Employer
Cooperation: Experiments with Real and Computational Agents,” Economic Report 55, Iowa
State University.
Riechmann, T. (1999), Learning and Behavioral Stability - An Economic Interpretation of Genetic
Algorithms, Journal of Evolutionary Economics 9, 225-242.
Riechmann, T. (2001a), Learning in Economics: Analysis and Application of Genetic Algorithms.
Contributions to Economics. Heidelberg and New York: Physica.
Riechmann, T. (2001b), “Genetic Algorithm Learning and Evolutionary Games,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Dynamics and Control 25(6-7), 1019-37.
Riechmann, T. (2002), “Cournot or Walras? Agent Based Learning, Rationality and Long Run
Results in Oligopoly Games,” Discussion Paper, Unviersity of Hannover.
Robinson, J. (1951) “An Iterative Method of Solving a Game,” The Annals of Mathematics 54,
296-301
Roth (1995), “Introduction to Experimental Economics” in J. Kagel and A.E. Roth, eds., Handbook
of Experimental Economics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Roth, A.E. and J.K. Murnighan (1978), “Equilibrium Behavior and Repeated Play of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 17: 189-198.
Roth, A.E. and I. Erev (1995), “Learning in Extensive—Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple
Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term,” Games and Economic Behavior. 8(1), 164—212.
Routledge, B.R. (2001), “Genetic Algorithm Learning to Choose and Use Information,” Macroeco-
nomic Dynamics, 5(2): 303-25.
49Sadrieh, A. (1998), The Alternating Double Auction Market: A Game Theoretic and Experimental
Investigation, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, Vol. 466, Springer, Berlin.
Salmon, T.C. (2001), An Evaluation of Econometric Models of Adaptive Learning Econometrica 69,
1597-1628.
Sargent, T.J. (1993), Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sarin, R. and F. Vahid (2001), “Predicting How People Play Games: A Simple Dynamic Model of
Choice,” Games and Economic Behavior 34, 104-22
Sarin, R. and F. Vahid (1999), “Payoﬀ Assessments without Probabilities: A Simple Dynamic Model
of Choice,” Games and Economic Behavior 28, 294-309
Selten, R. (1967) “Die Strategiemethdoe zur Erforschung des eingeschr¨ ankt rationalen Verhaltens
im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperiments,” in H. Sauermann, ed., Beitr¨ age zur Experimentellen
Wirtschaftsforschung,T ¨ ubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 136—168.
Selten, R. (1991) “Evolution, learning and economic behavior.” Games and Economic Behavior 3,
3-24.
Selten, R. M. Mitzkewitz, and G.R. Uhlich (1997) “Duopoly strategies programmed by experienced
players,” Econometrica 65, 517—555.
Schelling, T.C. (1978), Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: W.W. Norton.
Simon, H.A. (1955), “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 69,
99—118.
Simon, H.A. (1982), Models of Bounded Rationality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Smith, V.L. (1962), “An Experimental Study of Competitive Market behavior,” Journal of Political
Economy 70, 111-137.
Smith, V.L. (1982), “Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science,” American Economic
Review 72, 923-955.
Smith, V.L., G.L. Suchanek, and A.W. Williams (1988), “Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expec-
tations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets,” Econometrica 56, 1119-51.
Sonnemans, J. C. Hommes, J. Tuinstra and H. v.d. Velden (2004) “The Instability of a Heterogeneous
Cobweb Economy: A Strategy Experiment on Expectation Formation,” Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 54, 453-481.
Stahl D., (1999), “A Horse Race Among Action-Reinforcement Learning Models,” Working paper,
University of Texas at Austin.
Suppes, P. and R. Atkinson (1960), Markov Learning Models for Multiperon Interactions. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Sutton, R.S. and A.G. Barto (1998), Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Thorndike, E.L. (1911) Animal Intelligence, New York: Hafner Publishing.
50¨ Unver, M.U. (2001a), “Backward Unraveling Over Time: The Evolution of Strategic Behavior in
the Entry Level British Medical Labor Markets,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
25(6-7), 1039-80.
¨ Unver, M.U. (2001b), “On the Survival of Some Unstable Two—Sided Matching Mechanisms: An
Experimental and Comptational Investigation of the Stability Hypothesis,” working paper, Koc
Universtiy.
Valley, K., L. Thompson, R. Gibbons, M.H. Bazerman (2002), “How Communication Improves Eﬃ-
ciency in Bargaining Games,” Games and Economic Behavior 38, 127—155.
Van Boening, M.V. and Wilcox, N.T. (1996), “Avoidable Cost: Ride a Double Auction Roller
Coaster,” American Economic Review 86(3), 461-77.
Van Huyck, J.B., J.P. Cook, R.C. Battalio (1994), “Selection Dynamics, Asymptotic Stability, and
Adaptive Behavior,” Journal of Political Economy 102, 975—1005.
Van Huyck, J.B., J.P. Cook, R.C. Battalio (1997), “Adaptive Behavior and Coordination Failure,”
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 32(4), 483-503.
Vriend, N.J. (2000), “An Illustration of the Essential Diﬀerence between Individual and Social Learn-
ing, and Its Consequences for Computational Analyses,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control 24(1), 1-19.
Watkins C. (1989), “Learning From Delayed Rewards (PhD Dissertation) King’s College Cambridge,
England.
Wellford, C.P. (1989), “A Laboratory Analysis of Price Dynamics and Expectations in the Cobweb
Model,” Discussion Paper 89-15, Department of Economics, University of Arizona.
Young, P.H. (1993), The Evolution of Conventions, Econometrica 61(1), 57-84.
Young, P.H. (1998), Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
51